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Modern information technology evolves at a rapid pace, and the U.S. Marine Corps 
ground combat units require cutting-edge capabilities in order to maintain a competitive 
advantage. The advent and military application of smartphones and smartphone 
applications provide a plethora of advantages that these forces seek to leverage, yet the 
very rapidity of their development presents a host of network security problems. 
This thesis examines the conceptual risk framework for incorporating 
smartphones into ground combat units, and uses a cutting-edge smartphone capability, 
the Field Information Support Tool, as a case study.  Furthermore, the comparatively 
slow policy-making process of the DOD ensures that policy requirements will lag behind 
the emerging technologies and the novel threats these technologies introduce.  This thesis 
conducts a policy review of existing DOD policies that apply to smartphones and 
network security, as well as examines and models the policy formulation process in an 
effort to reform it in a way more conducive to the incorporation of fast-growing 
capabilities. 
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While commanding the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) from December 2008–March 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Martin Dempsey eloquently stated, “With the introduction of the iPhone and the 
3G network, access to information all-the-time exploded.  The question for us is whether 
we’re going to ignore it, or seek to take advantage of it” (Grindle, 2011, p. 1).  In the 
intervening years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has sought to capitalize on the 
ubiquity of smartphone technologies and the corresponding familiarity modern service 
members have with them to improve garrison and deployed operations.  Simental (2010) 
explained that “the Army wants to employ…everyday smartphone technology tools…in 
garrison…and, eventually, in combat operations” (p. 20).  Current programs, such as the 
Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P), fielded by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine 
Corps (USMC) forces starting in fiscal year 2013 (FY13), are designed to upgrade 
current Blue Force Tracker (BFT) applications as well as introduce a suite of Android-
based smartphone applications for tactical operations.  The JBC-P will come with a 
standard set of mapping, Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled BFT and Tactical 
Ground Reporting graphics and critical messaging (Heininger, 2011).  Indeed, as the 
JBC-P program attests, smartphones have become much more than mere communication 
devices.  Modern smartphones are more akin to hand-held mobile computers with the 
potential to provide real-time information and intelligence in a combat environment.   
This capability implies the inherent need for passing classified information and incurs all 
the risks entailed in transmitting classified military information.  
While the Army is leading the smartphone effort, the USMC has also taken note 
of the potential uses of smartphones, authorizing recruiters to use phones to take photos 
of prospective recruits (Sanborn, 2011).  More telling is the USMC-Lockheed Martin 
initiative to provide a tactical Smartphone network in support of Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions (PR Newswire, 2011).  The system, named 
MONAX, provides a portable fourth generation (4G) private cellular network for off-the-
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shelf smartphones with voice, data, and video services.  Though constructed primarily for 
HADR, the utility implications for smartphone apps across a broad range of military 
operations, to include combat reporting and intelligence dissemination, is self-evident.  
When viewed together, the JBC-P, Army outlook, and USMC initiatives evince the 
DOD’s push toward smartphone technologies and uses, and that these applications are 
here to stay.   
Despite the smartphone-driven explosion of wireless and cellular-enabled web-
access in the private sector, the military has been relatively slow to adopt the smartphone 
wholesale as programs of record.  As a result of the reactive nature of DOD’s approach, 
and particularly that of the USMC, which has heretofore allowed the Army to do most of 
the heavy lifting regarding smartphone technology development, security considerations 
and policy creation regarding the use of classified smartphone capabilities at the tactical 
level remain largely ignored.  In what appears to be an interim solution, the Army has 
turned to dealing with security of smartphones in much the same manner as computers 
and other mobile devices (Kenyon, 2011).  Specifically, the governing policy remains the 
DOD Directive (DODD) 8100.02 (2004), which is the “use of commercial Wireless 
Devices, Services, and Technologies in the Department of Defense Global Information 
Grid.”  Additionally, the Army has tried to conform to the DODD 8100.02 by 
incorporating the use of common access card (CAC) public key infrastructure (PKI) 
capabilities.  While this analogy approach is a useful starting point, treating a classified 
smartphone as any desktop computer overlooks some of the very aspects that make it 
such an attractive item; it’s light, hand-held mobility, ubiquity, tailored application 
modularity, small logistical footprint, and constant connectivity to the World Wide Web.  
The USMC, lagging behind the Army in smartphone implementation and even further in 
policy development, has yet to formulate policy beyond the published DODD 8100.02.  
As such, an in-depth policy and policy creation process review is warranted to ensure 
prudent policy formulation keeps pace with the security risks posed by wholesale 
adoption and incorporation of classified smartphone technologies within tactical USMC 
ground combat units, but which also expedites needed capabilities into the hands of the 
warfighters who require them to accomplish their critical missions. 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The current USMC processes for crafting security policy are too slow and 
unresponsive compared to the rapidly advancing field of cellular mobile smartphone 
communication technologies.  As a result, there is a dearth of proper security policies for 
incorporating these technologies into U.S. Marine Corps operational ground combat units 
despite warfighters’ calls for their adoption.  In addition, a lack of sufficient security 
policy and unresponsive and ill-suited policy formulation process results in costly delays 
fielding asked-for tools to the end-user, and increased costs associated with reworking 
legacy systems to accommodate security threats.  Furthermore this mismatch has the 
potential to result in compromise or spillage of classified material as smartphone 
technologies and capabilities appear in and are used by operational forces in both 
garrison and deployed environments absent judicious guidance or regulation.   
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to propose recommendations for future security 
policy and policy creation processes in order to decrease the costly lag time between 
technological development and adoption and the security policies access to DOD 
networks and end-user privileges.  The expressed objective of this research is to propose 
a framework for a more responsive IT system policy formulation process as well as to 
provide policy guidance, based on the proposed framework, for incorporating the Field 
Information Support Tool’s (FIST) smartphone technologies into operational USMC 
ground combat units.  Moreover, while this research will be conducted primarily with 
regards to U.S. Marine Corps policy and policy formulation processes, the 
recommendations will likely apply across the defense establishment, and could be used to 
improve security policy and process for mobile cellular smartphone technologies DOD-
wide. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is current policy regarding hand-held mobile smartphone technologies? 
2. What are the issues concerning this technology? 
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3. What policy changes must the Marine Corps make to take advantage of 
smartphone technology? 
E. RESEARCH METHODS 
This research relies on archival research and software simulation.  No field or 
laboratory testing is required.  The primary sources for this thesis are existing security 
policies in the DOD, component service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines), and 
other federal agencies.  The FIST project at the Naval Postgraduate School is used as a 
backdrop and case study example of a smartphone-based information technology system 
whose incorporation into the operational forces suffers from the limitations of the policy 
creation process.  In order to assess the current policy formulation process, Savvion 
Process modeling software will be used to map and model the current (As-Is) process as 
well as a possible future (To-Be) process for comparison and analysis.  This method will 
ensure the maintenance of a practical focus to the research as well as allow for the 
creation of recommended policy to govern incorporation smartphone-enabled capabilities 
into USMC ground combat units. 
F. DATA, OBSERVATION, AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
The method of analysis for this thesis will be a literature review of security 
policies governing other information communication technologies and those concerning 
cellular technologies, a study of the FIST/Lighthouse programs at the Naval Postgraduate 
School to provide a conceptual background to highlight the impact of existing and 
recommended policies, and a simulation of the current DOD policy formulation process 
using the Savvion business process modeling tool. 
G. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This study could identify serious gaps in current U.S. Marine Corps policy 
concerning incorporation of classified smart-phone technologies into the operating forces.  
The identification of these gaps, in conjunction with a set of recommendations for future 
policy formulation, would allow the USMC the opportunity to revise and create security 
policies concurrent and concordant with technological development, and in advance of 
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system procurement.  Ultimately, the ability to set educated policy into place early will 
prevent classified material compromise stemming from insufficient security policies or 
protocols, reduce system re-work costs to meet reactive and retroactive policy, and allow 
for timely incorporation of capabilities into the operating forces.  Lastly, the introduction 
of proper policy concurrent with technology development ensures minimization of cost-
overruns and system delays resulting from failure to conform to required standards. 
This research will be limited in its scope due to the overall classification level of 
the final product.  A SECRET and/or TOP-SECRET study would be required in order to 
provide a more comprehensive assessment of vulnerabilities to the existing technology.   
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This research is organized into seven chapters.  The first chapter provides an 
introduction the research topic area, outlines the problem space, the research’s purpose 
statement, the questions the research will seek to answer, and the methods by which the 
research will attempt to answer them.   
The second chapter provides a literature review of the technological capabilities 
of smartphones, vulnerabilities inherent in their use, uses of smartphone for tactical 
USMC ground combat units, and ways to implement mobile devices into these units.  The 
second chapter also provides a review of existing top-level DOD and USMC policies 
concerning mobile devices as well as a policy review of DOD security policies.   
The third chapter provides an overview of the FIST system, identifies issues 
arising from its introduction, implementation, and use, and provides an analysis of the 
gaps between existing security policies and the vulnerabilities of the FIST system as a 
case study for the larger gap between mobile device security and policy.  This chapter 
also presents a series of specific recommendations for bringing current security policy in 
line with the vulnerabilities in the FIST system. 
The fourth chapter details the simulation methodology and presents how the 
process was transcribed from the DOD Issuances website and into the Savvion process 
modeler.  This chapter then goes further to present a simulation of a proposed future (To-
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Be) policy formulation process based upon the ideas of business process reengineering 
and Design Thinking, again using the Savvion process modeler. 
The fifth chapter presents and compares the data and results from the simulations 
run as part of chapter four. 
The sixth chapter comprises an analysis of the results from the simulations, 
described in chapter five, and a discussion of how such a change effort might be managed 
in light of the interrelated fields of business process reengineering, change management, 
and Design. 
The seventh chapter summarizes the scope and organization of the research, 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of the technological capabilities of smartphones, 
vulnerabilities inherent in their use, and ways to implement mobile devices into tactical 
USMC ground combat units.  This chapter also reviews existing top-level DOD and 
USMC policies concerning mobile devices as well as DOD security policies.   
A. TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 
1. Technological Capabilities 
What people enjoy most about smartphones is their utility as an all-purpose 
communication and information-accessing device in the palm of one’s hand.  As such, 
the smartphone includes many features and characteristics not commonly associated with 
classified desktop/laptop computers such as open-source internet and email access, geo-
tagging features, the necessity for existing wireless and cellular networks, and ease of 
loss of such a small device.  Thus, pushing classified material wirelessly to a potentially 
unsecured smartphone inherently puts the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet) at risk (Bacon, 2011).  This risk only increases in light of excitement over the 
morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) uses for smartphones in a deployed environment.  
Mixing the ability to read biometric data about suspected insurgents with the notion of 
using smartphones to keep personnel stationed at austere and remote forward operating 
bases (FOB) connected with family and friends via social media poses worrisome 
concerns about operational security (OPSEC) and compromise of classified material 
(Simental, 2010).  
The problems surrounding securing computers and computer networks in the 
internet age are hardly new.  Thus, as outlined in the DODD 8100.02 (2004), enforcing 
CAC-enabled PKI is indeed a viable method for ensuring user authenticity and non-
repudiation.  However, the challenge is moving from the practical means of solving 
computer security issues to the unique challenges of the tactical environment (Bacon, 
2011).  Current Army policy requires smartphones to receive a Certificate of 
Networthiness from the Army Enterprise Designated Approval Authority prior to 
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connecting to Army networks  and their inclusion on the DOD Unified Capabilities 
Approved Products List (UC APL), which attests to a device’s interoperability and 
information assurance accreditation (Kenyon, 2011).  While the enactment of these 
policies in the Army is certainly more aggressive than in the USMC, which has yet to 
write initial policy, treating the smartphone as just another computer with access to the 
network, to say nothing of a classified network, fails to take into account several 
fundamental differences between the two.  The USMC must reevaluate the ways in which 
it creates policy for information technologies in order to ensure the user requirements are 
satisfied while also protecting access to classified networks through sensible standards, 
guidelines, and regulation. 
2. Technological Vulnerabilities of Smartphones 
a. Loss or Theft of the Device 
As VanAssche (2014) asserted, the primary difference between security for 
traditional computer and network systems and smartphones and other mobile devices is 
the inherent difficulty of safeguarding the physical security of the devices, as they are, by 
definition, designed to be highly portable.  Such portability represents a significant 
security threat, as one of the primary assumptions in most computer and network security 
planning entails that the physical security of the systems will remain intact.  The integrity 
of the system leads to the follow on assumption that the potential attacker will have to 
access data and systems via some external attack avenue, rather than from inside the 
system itself (Simpson, Backman, & Corley, 2011). 
Another important consideration is that mobile device security risks are not 
limited to accidental loss or theft.  Improper disposal or turnover of mobile devices also 
presents a significant threat (VanAssche, 2014).  Failure to completely remove sensitive 
information from devices prior to disposal affords access to a rich information store 
contained within the device itself, regardless of if that device retains access to the original 
systems (Landman, 2010).  Worse yet, if the device continues to have access to its 
original systems, improper disposal of the device fundamentally negates the implemented 
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and planned security measures, and compromises the system’s integrity in a way that is 
extremely difficult to detect or prevent (Seth & Keshav, 2005). 
b. Security Risks of Smartphone Platforms 
Moving away from the security risks introduced by the loss or theft of mobile 
devices and the subsequent and serious exploitation potential incurred due to an 
attacker’s possession of the device, the characteristics of the mobile devices’ platforms 
add security risks, as well (VanAssche, 2014).  As Ahmed and Ahamad (2012) 
suggested, flaws in platform security architecture produce two security threats.  First is 
the ability of an external attacker to access the device’s data while foregoing 
authentication or identity verification.  Second is the device’s ability to access systems 
based off of the trust inherent in possession of the device and using the device as an 
authentication criterion.   
In order to prevent exploitation based off of the security threats identified above, 
designers must take care to evaluate the security implementation of the mobile device 
itself.  This evaluation of the device’s operating system and architecture should be based 
off of key characteristics identified by Zefferer, Kreuzhuber, and Teufl (2013) as follows:  
Access protection: This aspect covers the platform’s support for access 
protection features. These features assure that only legitimate users are 
able to access the smartphone’s GUI and data stored on the device. 
Typical implementations of access-protection mechanisms on smartphones 
rely on password based authentication schemes. When assessing the 
security of a smartphone platform, the set of supported access-protection 
methods and their resistance against known attacks need to be considered. 
Encryption: Encryption is a cryptographic method that assures the 
confidentiality of data. Current smartphone platforms typically support 
different types and methods of encryption. An important aspect of 
encryption systems is the secure derivation and storage of encryption keys 
that are used to encrypt confidential data. The set of supported encryption 
methods and implemented key-derivation functions are hence main 
aspects that need to be considered when assessing the security of 
smartphone platforms. 
Secure storage of credentials: PINs, passwords, or cryptographic keys that 
grant access to protected data or services are usually subsumed under the 
term credentials. Credentials represent highly confidential data that need 
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to be appropriately protected when being stored on smartphones. Some 
smartphone platforms provide especially protected storage locations for 
credentials. The availability of such storage locations and their capability 
to protect credentials are important aspects that need to be considered 
when assessing the security of smartphone platforms. 
Mobile device management: Supported security features such as access 
protection or encryption are typically optional and need to be manually 
enabled by the user. Experience has shown that users often refrain from 
activating these features for convenience reasons. Mobile device 
management (MDM) has recently evolved as a potential solution to this 
problem, as it allows for a central management and configuration of 
smartphones. Furthermore, MDM allows for remote execution of tasks 
and routines on smartphones. This way, data stored on smartphones can 
for instance be remotely deleted (remote wipe) when the device gets lost 
or stolen. (pp. 129–130) 
Since shortfalls or deficiency in any one, or more, of these key areas represents a serious 
security risk, a platform must successfully and comprehensively address each of these 
four areas to be considered a secure mobile platform (VanAssche, 2014).   
Addressing the second security threat depends on the authentication method the 
system uses to verify that a user is valid, and not in violation of confidentiality 
protections, prior to allowing access to a system or data (VanAssche, 2014).  Ahmed and 
Ahamad (2012) asserted that any system or application which relies solely, or primarily, 
on possession or capabilities of the mobile device alone (for instance, using a device 
serial number or some other intrinsic identification method), cannot be considered 
reliably secure.  Rather, in order to maintain confidentiality protections, the user must 
provide some form of authentication that is unique to that user, and entirely separate from 
the device (VanAssche, 2014).  Ideally, this authentication system would be based on 
identical criteria as non-mobile platform authentication.  Unfortunately, as Varadharajan 
(2000) argued, identical methods are not always possible, such as in cases where mobile 
devices do not support common structures such as physical access tokens (i.e., smart 
cards/CAC).  Such instances require system architects and security designers to recognize 
the disparity and to institute equivalent authentication procedures in order to maintain 
comparable levels of security within the system (VanAssche, 2014). 
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c. Risks in the Supporting Architecture 
Though a detailed discussion of the risks to the technological architecture which 
supports mobile devices is beyond the scope of this research, it is sufficient to say that the 
back-end systems such as the server and data transport are also at risk.  Elucidation of 
these risks falls within the realm of computer security, and encompass a whole new series 
of complicated protocols and governing policies.   
3. Vulnerabilities Stemming from Smartphone Usage 
It is the very dual use potential of smartphones, for both personal and business 
functions, which makes them both an attractive platform and a security risk (Hibbard, 
2011).  In essence, the armed services must balance the smartphone’s power as an 
information accessing and social media tool with the necessarily restrictive nature of 
access to classified material.  The USMC must therefore treat the viruses and malware 
affecting smartphones as it would those attacking any other information system (Hibbard, 
2011).  The deceivingly simple answer to this problem is that unit-level information 
technology (IT) professionals need to implement security measures to protect 
smartphones from worms, viruses, and Peer-to-Peer applications (Hibbard, 2011).  
However, absent unified security policy from the DOD or Headquarters Marine Corps, 
these measures would be recommendations only, and subject to change or allowed to lax 
during the frequent personnel rotations which characterize the DOD.   
Current research or policy does not discuss or evaluate the social engineering and 
counterintelligence risks posed by smartphone interaction with social media sites, and 
yet, as this is one of the primary uses of the smartphones which leadership foresees, a 
security policy review taking these factors into account is critical.  Smartphones contain 
more personal data than was stored in older, analog phones (Eaton, 2010).  Smartphones 
have numerous applications that store critical and sensitive information such as login 
names and passwords, contacts, or other identifying information that an adversary could 
use to re-create sensitive information (Hibbard, 2011). For example, currently, the 
government-issued BlackBerrys have automated links to the workplace and email, which, 
in turn, means that a lost phone could jeopardize all of the sensitive information located 
 11 
in e-mail, contacts, social networking applications, and geotagging.  Geotagging, the 
process of adding geographical identification to photographs, video, websites, and SMS 
messages, is one of the greatest threats to social networking sites, and by extension, 
smartphones with enabled social networking features (Robillard, 2011).  Geotags embed 
the equivalent of a 10-digit grid coordinate in pictures taken with smartphones. When that 
picture, video, or message posts to the Internet, key personal or operational information is 
provided to the world, and by consequence, to the enemy (U.S. Army Office of the Chief 
of Public Affairs, 2011).  Location-based social networking is growing in popularity and 
increasing the military’s OPSEC threat.  These applications, ubiquitous on smartphones, 
are extremely dangerous, and easily interpreted by adversaries. Location-based social 
networking helps adversaries establish patterns, exposes places of duty and home station 
by tracking movements, and aggregating information that identifies locations of service 
personnel (U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, 2011).  While it is easy to 
stipulate that the solution lies simply in having leadership educate and mandate personnel 
to disable geotagging in smartphones or forbid posting geotagged media to social media 
sites, the very existence of the capability in the hands of deployed personnel increases the 
likelihood of spillage (U.S. Army Social Media Handbook, 2011, p. 5).  Despite guidance 
concerning geotagging within the Army, there currently exists no codified security policy 
within the DOD or the USMC to address geotagging security concerns at the tactical 
ground combat unit level when the compromise of such information can spell mission 
failure.   
As Hibbard (2011) attested, worse than information found within geo-tagged 
pictures, real time location tracking of soldiers or Marines both in the continental United 
States and abroad also poses a significant threat.  What Hibbard’s (2011) study does not 
address is how this vulnerability is exacerbated when facing a technologically savvy foe, 
or in remote areas such as Afghanistan where infrastructure is limited, and ad-hoc 
networks are required to be established.  There are three basic techniques to determine 
the location of a cell phone or other similar device: using GPS, cell phone tower 
triangulation, and tracking Wi-Fi signals from transmitters (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2011).  While such real-time location tracking, as is currently found in 
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Blue Force Tracker, is a useful tool for ground commanders, the way in which 
smartphones perform this function through Wi-Fi signals and cell phone towers opens up 
the ground combat force to exploitation by the enemy, which can use the technology in 
much the same manner to determine friendly locations.  While the capability is known, as 
well as the self-evident damage should the enemy acquire such information, there 
currently exists no codified security policy within the DOD or the USMC to address these 
triangulation concerns at the tactical ground combat unit level.   
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies carry the added vulnerabilities 
that the DOD has little to no control over their manufacture.  Of particular note is the fact 
that these devices and their associated software might be developed in foreign countries 
which, while their economic interests might align compatibly with those of the United 
States, might wish to degrade or have access to U.S. foreign policy and military 
capability.  Put more simply, it is not above a modern nation state to introduce malicious 
software into COTS systems in order to gain a national advantage.  For instance, a 
government could, and indeed has, insert a  
“sleeper” program that embeds in [a victim’s] computer. That program can 
be controlled remotely, allowing the attacker to access e-mail, send 
confidential documents to a specific address—even turn on a Web camera 
or microphone to record what is going on in the room.  In many cases, a 
user does not know he has been the victim of an attack. (Cha & 
Nakashima, 2010, p. 2) 
Despite the vulnerabilities, the pervasiveness and reliance  on smartphones means 
that in conjunction with the absence of existing policy, ground combat units will continue 
to search for a way to satisfy their need for a mobile, hand-held field data-collection and 
analysis system.  Based up on service culture, organizations are likely to proceed in one 
of two ways.  Either they will say that unless allowed by regulation, such technologies 
are forbidden, or they will take the opposite approach and use technologies unless 
prohibited by order and regulation.  Take, for example, the following testimony from two 
Marine captains who recently served in Iraq and Afghanistan:   
During a recent deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), the officer had several experiences with regards 
to cellular devices. As a logistician for a Special Operations Task Force 
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(SOTF), the officer filled an information sharing gap by purchasing 
cellular devices through the local Afghan market. The “flip phones” and 
“blackberries” used Afghan minute cards which were also bought through 
the local market. The phones operated on the existing Afghan network. 
These cellular devices were issued to key personnel throughout the 
support center. In total there were approximately 40–60 cellular devices 
that were either turned over from redeploying SOTF personnel or bought 
for the support center of 150 Marines. Marines who did not receive a 
turned over or issued cellular device bought their own through the local 
market. 
These cellular devices proved to be a valuable piece of Command and 
Control (C2) not only for the officer within the support center, but also 
supporting the Special Operations Teams throughout the country. Specific 
examples were the ability to enhance multi-tasking, find personnel more 
easily, speed up support, and pass information more effectively. Since the 
devices used were not encrypted, the type of information sharing was 
limited, but still allowed for better logistics support throughout the 
battalion, a wider distribution of personnel and faster flow of information 
up and down the chain of command. 
One specific example was an issue with a particular air re-supply drop. 
Each Special Operation Team also had a local Afghan cellular capability. 
Able to use the cellular device in a limited capacity, the officer was able to 
contact the remote Team and adjust the re-supply given a time sensitive 
situation. Another observation on the use of cellular devices was noted 
during a visit to Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan. The officer observed 
many of the Marines possessed personal Afghan cellular devices in and 
around the camp using both voice and text capabilities. Upon asking the 
Marines how they were using the devices; it became clear they were 
organizing and passing information much like they would in a garrison 
environment.  These observations and experience in a fast-paced tactical 
environment posed the question, “Why doesn’t the Marine Corps have 
cellular or smartphone devices for Marines operating at the tactical edge?” 
This same question was posed to the officer at a remote site in 
Afghanistan by a Staff Sergeant who simply asked, “Why can’t we have a 
mobile network to use secure cellular smartphones?” This question 
highlights the perceived technology gap between the information agility 
the Marine wanted and what was available. These needs and actions 
observed while deployed spawns the idea to have government issued smart 
devices that can communicate voice, text and data; enhancing information 
flow up and down the chain of command. Leveraging commercial off the 
shelf technology has the potential for the Marine Corps to increase 
capabilities, decrease logistics support which in turns provides cost 
savings. Marines buying these phones on their own accord demonstrate a 
certain willingness to pay (WTP). (Liguori & Daniel, 2013, pp. 1–2) 
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As can be seen clearly in the anecdote above, Marines will find a way to get their 
mission accomplished, to include using devices whose network security and authorization 
lie in gray areas on the peripheries of current accepted platforms. On the other hand, the 
questions posed above are perfectly legitimate given the pace, scope, and capability of 
modern cellular communications technology.  The ambiguity and lack of policy and a 
responsive policy crafting process introduces unnecessary risk of classified material  that 
can compromise warfighters whose missions—and lives—depend on having information 
in the palms of their hands.  A review of the existing literature demonstrates the policy to 
be insufficient and illustrates that the creation process is unresponsive.  This research 
intends to carry the effort forward and propose a framework for a more responsive IT 
system policy formulation process as well as provide policy guidance, based off of the 
proposed framework, for incorporating smartphone technologies into operational USMC 
ground combat units. 
4. Ways to Implement Secure Mobile Cellular into Tactical Units 
The following section discusses several alternatives for achieving secure mobile 
cellular (SMC) capabilities in ground combat units using emerging technologies.  This 
section is useful since it serves to link the smartphone application and backend server 
discussion from Lighthouse/FIST with the capabilities to enable such a system in a 
deployed environment.  In other words, reliance on a previously established cellular 
infrastructure is not inherently necessary to operate a SMC network. 
a. Lockheed Martin’s MONAX System 
The MONAX system, developed by Lockheed Martin, is a private, deployable, 
cellular network which provides 3G and 4G communications capabilities to low-cost, 
commercially available, Wi-Fi-enabled devices (IS&GS Defense, n.d.). The MONAX 
system delivers secure multimedia Internet protocol (IP) services such as voice, data, and 
video to mobile users (IS&GS Defense, n.d.). The MONAX system consists of a sleeve, 
called the Lynx, as well as a base station.  The base station can be either single sector or 
three sectors (a sector is a 120-degree transmission/reception swath achieved using a 
directional antenna).  Three sectors provide 360 degrees of coverage.  MONAX base 
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stations may be operated in fixed configurations or mounted on vehicles for OTM 
communications.  As depicted in Figure 1, MONAX is a rapidly deployable tactical 
cellular system which can be operated from a fixed or mobile platform and which aims to 
provide support to the individual user and mobile user (IS&GS Defense, n.d.).  
 
Figure 1.  Lockheed Martin MONAX Concept of Operations 
(from IS&GS Defense, n.d.) 
b. Oceus Networks’ Xiphos System 
In a program named Joint Operational Long Term Evolution Deployable 
(JOLTED)—Tactical Cellular System (TACTICS) Joint Capabilities Technical 
Demonstration (JCTD), the U.S. Army has also sought to implement and benefit from 
COTS technology. JOLTED-TACTICS provides robust communications to dismounted, 
fixed or OTM tactical users through its COTS-Internet Protocol (IP)-based system 
(Whittaker, 2011).  This system employs innovations in fourth generation (4G) long-term 
evolution (LTE) cellular technologies to deliver data rates on the order of Megabits to 
mobile and dismounted users equipped with smartphones or other personal electronic 
devices (PED) (Liguori & Daniel, 2013).  As Figure 2 shows, through the use of 
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JOLTED-TACTICS, tactical units are able to access applications such as streaming 
media, Voice over Internet Protocol, e-mail, and instant messaging for immediate 
situational awareness using COTS 4G/LTE technologies (Whittaker, 2011).  
 
Figure 2.  Oceus Networks Concept of Operations (from Liguori & Daniel, 2013) 
Of the primary innovations from Oceus Networks is the Xiphos Base Station. The 
Xiphos Base Station, as shown in Figure 3, was in operation in 2013 with both the U.S. 
Army and the U.S. Navy, which was conducting pilot tests with the system. As a result of 
its employment, the Army has currently contracted to purchase 36 Xiphos Systems 
(Liguori & Daniel, 2013). 
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Figure 3.  Xiphos Base Station (from Liguori & Daniel, 2013) 
The Xiphos comes in two different configurations which are the “1 Radio Unit” 
(1 RU), which services from 100 to 200 tactical cellular connections, and the larger “6 
RU” configuration, which can handle approximately 1200 connections (Liguori & 
Daniel, 2013). The 1 RU Xiphos is suited for a tactical USMC unit of approximately 
Company size, while the larger 6 RU Xiphos is more suited for a significant-sized 
Forward Operating Base (FOB) on the scale of Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan. For 
example, a typical Infantry Battalion or Marine Expeditionary unit (MEU) would require 
five “1 RU” Xiphos Base Stations (Liguori & Daniel, 2013). Xiphos uses Ka band 
technology for backhaul, and can interface with either military satellites or commercial 
satellites, such as the O3b Networks COMSATCOM constellation. The Xiphos 4G/LTE 
system spans the three operational scenarios of fixed, dismounted, and OTM, thereby 
providing information to the tactical edge of the battlefield (Liguori & Daniel, 2013). 
B. CURRENT DOD AND USMC AND POLICY 
As Liguori and Daniel (2013) asserted, both the military and commercial sectors 
have explored the concept of a Secure Mobile Cellular (SMC) capability for use by 
expeditionary forces.  Both of these evaluators seek to expand their capabilities and 
information sharing, while preserving the security of sensitive data. In the private and 
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commercial sector, however, cellular capabilities are tailored to meet market demands, 
which have not yet shown a high degree of interest for highly secure cellular services 
beyond specific small-scale purchases by the U.S. government.  Because of this lack of 
demand, as well as the obvious accompanying risks associated with unsecure 
communications, the DOD lags behind commercial entities in terms of adopting mobile 
computing technologies.   
Nevertheless, the DOD and USMC are taking steps to close the gap of highly 
mobile communication devices that have voice and data capabilities (Liguori & Daniel, 
2013).  These steps do not entail purely embracing the newest technology, but rather 
focus on keeping the DOD workforce relevant in an era when information, its 
accessibility, and the capability to process it play an increasingly critical role in mission 
success (Cox, 2013). Through the policy formulation process, which will be described 
later in this paper, the DOD assumes the lead in developing policy that guides Marine 
Corps strategy. Assessing the documents which stem from this simple top-down 
approach, the policies and strategies in Figure 4 demonstrate an evolution in thinking for 
operating in non-traditional workspaces from top to bottom guidance. The ability to raise 
situational awareness at all levels of deployed Marine Corps units may enhance mobility 
across the war fighting functions. As shown in Figure 4, the top-down DOD policies and 
strategies show a trend to leverage COTS technology in mobile computing (Liguori & 
Daniel, 2013). 
 
Figure 4.  DOD and USMC Policy and Strategy for Mobile Devices 
(from Liguori & Daniel, 2013) 
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1. DOD Mobile Device Strategy 
Recognizing the current uses and future capabilities that mobile devices offer, the 
DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), Teresa Takai, published the DOD Mobile Device 
Strategy in 2012 in order to capitalize on the full potential of mobile devices (Office of 
the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012).  As defined by the DOD 
Mobile Device Strategy, a mobile device is a 
handheld computing device with a display screen that allows for user 
input. When connected to a network, it enables information sharing in 
formats specially designed to maximize the use of information given 
device limitations. (Office of the Department of Defense Chief 
Information Officer, 2012, p. i) 
The increasing use of smartphones and tablet computers, which provide a 
continuous link to the Internet, social media, and apps has made information sharing not 
merely a capability, but an expectation, particularly among younger service members 
who have grown up with it at their fingertips. The DOD challenge becomes to support the 
users requiring access to information anywhere and anytime across the DOD Information 
Enterprise (IE), facilitating making informed decisions in the execution of the assigned 
mission (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012, p. 2). 
The DOD CIO’s implicit vision is to have a highly mobile workforce equipped 
with secure access to information and computing power anytime and anywhere (Office of 
the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). Providing deployed 
personnel with a secure smartphone capability is directly linked to this vision (Liguori & 
Daniel, 2013).  The DOD Mobile Device strategy also highlights the need for ubiquitous 
information sharing through mobile computing for units maneuvering in austere and 
unfamiliar environments. Applications and capabilities, from real time map data—to 
assessing medical lab results remotely, would certainly be of benefit to expeditionary 
military units (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). 
a. Strategic Goals 
The DOD seeks to create a wireless infrastructure based on existing networks in 
order to provide accesses for wireless mobile devices to enable warfighters to profit from 
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mobile computational power.  The wireless infrastructure is an expansion of the current 
DOD IE which can be leveraged to connect mobile capabilities and technologies.  The 
DOD must focus on three critical areas central to mobility:  the wireless infrastructure, 
the devices themselves, and the applications the devices use (Office of the Department of 
Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). With these critical areas in mind, the DOD 
defined three major goals, depicted in Figure 5, each with practical implementation 
subcomponents which the DOD named objectives: 
 
Figure 5.  Goals of the DOD Mobile Device Strategy (from Office of the Department of 
Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012) 
Goal 1. Advance and evolve the DOD Information Enterprise infrastructure to 
support mobile devices. – The intent behind this goal is to improve the existing wireless 
backbone to support secure voice, data, and video capabilities for mobile devices.  
Moreover, the DOD also looks to reduce the tethering of individuals to desks, as well as 
potentially to reduce costs for office space and desktops and other hardware (Office of 
the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). 
Objective a.  Evolve spectrum management.  The DOD understands the need to 
manage what is a finite electromagnetic spectrum as the explosion of wireless networks 
puts added stress on an already constrained allocation system.  Particularly, the DOD 
turns its attention to academia to expand and improve up on current multiple access 
techniques (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). 
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Objective b.  Expand infrastructure to support wireless capabilities.  With the 
ideal being a wireless unclassified and classified mobile network, the DOD desires to 
base its infrastructure off of the industry standards of the IEEE 802.11-based Wide Local 
Area Network (WLAN) as well as commercial 4G technology (Office of the Department 
of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012).   
Objective c.  Establish a mobile device security architecture.  Perhaps one of the 
most challenging elements of the mobile device strategy, the need for a secure mobile 
architecture is underscored by the myriad traditional and novel security risks.  
Specifically, the DOD plans to mitigate some of these risks through the inclusion of PKI 
security, access, and identification controls at all levels of the architecture, to include the 
application, device, and network (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information 
Officer, 2012). 
Goal 2. Institute mobile device policies and standards. – The intent behind this 
goal is to create a top-down framework to govern device usage, interoperability, and 
device lifecycle management (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information 
Officer, 2012). 
Objective a.  Develop mobile device policy and standards.  As mentioned earlier, 
while the cost-savings potential to use commercial off the shelf (COTS) devices is 
tantalizing, most do not come fully equipped to meet the DOD security needs.  Hence, the 
DOD desires to expedite and standardize technology development in a fashion which 
offers the ability to rapidly incorporate new commercial advances, while also allows 
DOD modification and security enhancement.  Additionally, the DOD plans to evaluate 
the use of personally owned devices critically in order to gain efficiencies while 
maintaining network security (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information 
Officer, 2012). 
Objective b.  Establish a mobile device management service.  This service would 
attempt to manage mobile devices centrally to the extent that they need licensing, 
registration, and continuing software and security upgrades as well as to monitor network 
usage and health (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). 
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Objective c.  Educate and train mobile device users.  Another equally essential 
element in this strategy is the increased levels of trust required between network 
administrators and the individual user, particularly where a bring your own device 
(BYOD) architecture is concerned.  The DOD’s recognition that in many cases, user-
based enforcement of security measures is the only effective approach, and that such a 
measure will require additional training for the force to underscore its importance (Office 
of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). 
Goal 3. Promote the development and use of DOD mobile and web-enabled 
applications. – The intent behind this goal is to outline processes and standards for 
application development, testing, and fielding within the DOD to ensure more rapid 
distribution of approved DOD mobile applications to the end users, as well as a web-
based support service for mobile devices and applications (Office of the Department of 
Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). 
Objective a.  Establish a common mobile application development framework.  
Whereas commercial entities frequently provide pre-made kits to assist with development 
and testing of new applications, these kits are operating system specific, and therefore 
pose limited utility in a more heterogeneous DOD environment.  With a primary focus on 
interoperability, the DOD intends to leverage commercial capabilities, and indeed may go 
so far as to instruct components how to use commercial app building kits, while also 
adding in guidelines to support OS-generic operation.  Perhaps the most challenging 
aspect of this framework would be the requirement to evolve as industry standards 
advance, as the DOD is not known for rapid policy evolution (Office of the Department 
of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012).  
Objective b.  Institute a mobile application certification process.  In anticipation 
of the profusion of new applications, the DOD perceives the need for a centralized and 
standardized application certification process which is both more comprehensive and 
swifter than its current model.  Most specifically, the DOD is concerned with ensuring 
applications are free from known exploitable vulnerabilities, are interoperable, and can be 
monitored to enforce compliance with policy and regulation (Office of the Department of 
Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012). 
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Objective c.  Provide an enterprise mobile application environment.  Going hand 
in hand with the previously described certification process, the DOD also sees the need to 
provide a total mobile application environment to support the creation, certification, 
fielding, and maintenance of mobile applications across the DOD.  The DOD seeks to 
federate application creation in an effort to reduce costs by making approved apps and 
derivatives more widely available for reuse as well as incorporating tracking features into 
apps such that upgrades and other system lifecycle events are easily executed.  The DOD 
focus for this objective is on the app submission, development, certification and approval, 
management, and compliance processes (Office of the Department of Defense Chief 
Information Officer, 2012).  
Objective d.  ‘Web-enable’ IT capabilities for mobile device support.  Concerned 
with the growing pace of technological advancement, the DOD grasps the need to 
develop a web-enabled IT support system for mobile devices and applications.  This 
support would cover elements from display and presentation upgrades, to software and 
security features (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012).   
2. Guidance from Senior USMC Leadership 
In a combination of current DOD policies and the war time experiences of the 
past decade, it becomes clear that the USMC seeks to return to its roots as America’s 
expeditionary force in readiness. A strong focus on command and control (C2) will aid in 
the evolution to a mobile force (Liguori & Daniel, 2013). As stated in MCDP-6, 
No single activity in war is more important than command and control.  
Command and control by itself will not drive home a single attack against 
an enemy force. It will not destroy a single enemy target. It will not affect 
a single emergency resupply. Yet none of these essential war fighting 
activities, or any others, would be possible without effective command and 
control. Without command and control, campaigns, battles, and organized 
engagements are impossible, military units degenerate into mobs, and the 
subordination of military force to policy is replaced by random violence. 
In short, command and control is essential to all military operations and 
activities. (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996, p. 35)  
The communication processes which unify the other war fighting functions 
(Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Logistics and Force Protection) fall under the theme of 
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C2.  In the current fiscally constrained environment, and having an appreciation for the 
requirement to be more mobile than ever before, the senior leadership guidance for the 
way ahead focuses on leveraging military and COTS technological innovation to enable 
increasingly decentralized command, rapid feedback, and improved decision making at 
all levels of the force (Liguori & Daniel, 2013). 
3. Priorities of the 35th USMC Commandant 
The 35th Marine Corps Commandant released his 2010 planning guidance in 
order to outline his priorities and set the tone for the Marine Corps. He noted that, “The 
future will be different from the world we knew prior to the attack on 9-11. Through 
innovation and willingness to adapt, we will remain the ready and relevant force America 
relies on in times of crisis” (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010a, p. ii). Of particular note in this 
guidance is the discussion of rebalancing the Marine Corps for the future by aggressive 
experimentation and the intent to implement new capabilities. Also as shown in Figure 6, 
the Commandant emphasized that the focus must be on training Marines for distributed 
operations and increasingly complex environments. These strategic planning factors 
shape the need for a highly network-enabled device to provide the tactical Marine with 
enhanced situational awareness and to increase information sharing across the war 
fighting functions. 
 
Figure 6.  35th USMC Commandant Priorities (from U.S. Marine Corps, 2010a, p. 8) 
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4. USMC Vision and Strategy 2025 
In 2010, the Commandant also published the Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 
2025 which aims to posture the USMC for the future through an elucidation of a common 
outlook. Within the strategy, the Commandant detailed ten task clusters grouped into 
three main themes: 
• Focus on the Individual Marine: Improve Training and Education for fog, 
friction and Uncertainty—Posture for hybrid threats in complex 
environments—Build and deploy multi-capable MAGTFs (U.S. Marine 
Corps, 2010b). 
• Expand persistent forward presence and engagement—Lead Joint 
Operations and enable interagency activities (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010b) 
• Reinforce naval relationships—joint sea basing capabilities—Focus on 
amphibious force levels (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010b) 
As might be discerned, the first theme assumes the information sharing and 
processing capacity implied in the mobile device strategy and senior Marine Corps 
Leadership guidance. As such, this theme prompted the development of command and 
control systems for improving the situational awareness of the individual Marine. To 
keep the Marine Corps systems development objectives aligned to the strategy, Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Quantico Virginia issued the following 
guidance internally in 2012 via the program manager of MAGTF Command, Control and 
Communications: 
• Develop necessary capability and capacity to effectively operate in 
the information environment (Reddy, 2012). 
• Integrate command and control (C2) and Individual Squad Radios 
(ISR) capabilities down to the squad level (Reddy, 2012). 
5. USMC MAGTF 2012 C2 Roadmap 
The Marine Corps released its 2012 roadmap for MAGTF C2 in 2012.  This 
strategy document focuses on providing the right information to the right Marine at the 
right time in order to make timely and informed decisions (Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2013). The core tenants of the roadmap orient the Marine Corps 
to develop C2 systems given the current and future information environment and seek to 
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aid in defining overarching capability.  The core tenants as stated in the 2012 MAGTF 
Roadmap are: 
• Commander and Leader centric 
• Network enabled 
• Information assurance 
• Collaborative, shared situational understanding 
• Performed at all echelons 
• Performed anywhere in the battlespace 
These six tenants guide the conceptualization and development of systems away 
from a system-centric approach and to more of a user focus that enhances leader-centric, 
network enabled operations (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2013). The 
C2 roadmap outlines the basic elements of C2 as people, information, procedures, as well 
as a support structure for the people who create, disseminate and use information (Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command, 2013). To enable information and raised 
awareness at all levels, the concept of being “Network enabled” is a critical evolutionary 
component in preparing Marine Corps forces for the future. “The current network 
infrastructure must transition to a tightly integrated, agile, defensible, survivable network 
capable of supporting widely distributed operations” (Liguori & Daniel, 2013). 
6. USMC Commercial Mobility Strategy 2013 
In 2013, the USMC Director for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computers (C4) released the USMC Commercial Mobility Strategy to further guide and 
execute the above policies and guidance. Specially, through the Commercial Mobility 
Strategy, the Marine Corps sought to align DOD and Marine Corps Strategies in 
conjunction with the current DOD priority to consolidate data centers in an effort to 
enable a cloud computing environment (Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computers [C4], 2013). General Kevin Nally, Director C4, stated, “With increasing 
mobile device capabilities, the Marine Corps recognizes the trend of evolving 
information needs within garrison and tactical environments and the need to provide an 
agile method of meeting those needs” (C4, 2013, p. 3). The USMC Commercial Mobility 
Strategy focuses on the device user and the ability to share information via platform 
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agnostic programs and applications. The underlying driver behind this focus is that raised 
situational awareness stemming from information sharing, both in garrison and deployed 
roles, will enable more efficient mission accomplishment (Liguori & Daniel, 2013).  
Furthermore, as General Nally contended, as the user gains flexible and ubiquitous ability 
to share information effectively to raise situational awareness and reduce decision-
making timelines, the increased capacity to access, share, and manipulate data and 
information will provide users enhanced freedom of movement across the seven war 
fighting functions (C4, 2013). As stated in the USMC Commercial Mobility Strategy 
(2013) the four goals are: 
• Establish a Secure Mobile Framework 
• Transition the Unclassified Mobile Device Infrastructure to a Cost 
Effective and Platform Agnostic Environment 
• Collaborate with DOD and Industry Partners to Develop a 
Classified Mobile Device Capability 
• Incorporate Personally Owned Mobile Devices 
C. DOD AND USMC SECURITY POLICY 
1. DODI 8500.01: Cybersecurity 
Published in March 2014, the new DODI 8500.01 cancelled the legacy 
Information Assurance Instruction (8500.01E, April 2007) as well as ten other DODI and 
memoranda (Department of Defense, 2014b).  Critical aspects of this instruction outline 
that cybersecurity will be integrated into all aspects of system lifecycles, with the 
subsequent corollary that cybersecurity personnel must therefore also be fully integrated 
into all phases of system development lifecycles.   
DODI 8500.01 goes on to discuss that the DOD will make public key (PK) 
encryption the standard for all DOD information systems and will “implement a DOD-
wide PKI solution that will be managed by the DOD PKI Program Management Office” 
(Department of Defense, 2014b).  Furthermore, DODI 8500.01 provides for the inclusion 
and incorporation of biometrics to assist in support of identity assurance.  DODI 8500.01 
also mentions the desirability for systems to be able to self-reconfigure and self-recover 
against attacks wherever possible. 
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In addition to the requirement to develop and maintain sufficient cybersecurity 
protocols for all DOD information systems, and to protect DOD information with 
requisite levels of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, DODI 8500.01 also lays out 
responsibilities and procedures for this policy throughout the DOD.  A discussion of the 
cybersecurity procedures will follow. 
a. Enclosure 3 (Procedures) to DODI 8500.01 
Enclosure three to DODI 8500.01 focuses on a plethora of cybersecurity topics 
ranging from operational resiliency to requirements of the cybersecurity workforce.  
However, the first subject area addressed is that of risk management, and as such this 
paper will mention that area first as well.   
DODI 8500.01 identifies that cybersecurity risk management is a subset of 
acquisition risk management. Logically then, the risk assessment process for 
cybersecurity would extend to the logistical support apparatus required to maintain the 
integrity of the fielded equipment (Department of Defense, 2014b).  In other words, much 
as initial operational spares and replacement and upgrade considerations must be part of 
the deliberate planning and risk assessment for any project, cybersecurity upgrades, 
refreshes and maintainability items must be included in risk management discussions.  To 
that end, the DOD CIO identified a three-tiered approach to cybersecurity risk 
management as outlined in Figure 7 below, as well as a separate risk management 
framework (RMF), which is described in DODI 8510.01.   
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Figure 7.  Three-Tiered Approach to Risk Management 
(from Department of Defense, 2014b, p. 28) 
The key items to note from this diagram are that risk management decisions flow 
both ways in the organization in that while the tactical decisions are guided by the 
organizational perspective from tier 1, tiers 1 and 2 are also influenced by the decisions 
made at tier 3.   
Other items of note from enclosure three are the decision to protect all DOD IS in 
accordance with National Security System security controls, the requirement to plan and 
resource penetration and exploitation testing during the developmental test and evaluation 
(DT&E) and the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) phases of the acquisition cycle, 
and finally the emphasis on a net-centric approach to cybersecurity.  In the net-centric 
approach, DODI 8500.01 encourages the use of modern interconnectedness to “form new 
capabilities and teams without being constrained by geographical, organizational, or 
technical barriers” (Department of Defense, 2014b, p. 32).  In addition, enclosure three 
obliges DOD IS’ to provide for compatibility and authentication processes for use by 
coalition mission partners, to include a PKI application designed for foreign nationals.  
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The overarching theme running through DODI 8500.01 is that of holistic security.  
While each subsystem and indeed each piece of DOD information should enjoy a level of 
security commensurate with its status, the central idea is that no IS or piece of 
information should degrade the systems or enterprise to which it is interconnected 
(Department of Defense, 2014b).  In effect, due to such interconnectedness, any one link 
in the cable may prove to be the weakness by which an adversary gains an advantage, and 
so testing and security considerations cannot view a system as a stand-alone entity, and 
instead must also account for ways in which one system’s weaknesses may expose those 
that link to it to risk. 
2. DODD 8000.01: Management of the DOD Information Enterprise 
In standard hierarchical fashion, management of the DOD IE flows downward 
from the Secretary of Defense to the heads of the DOD components, and then to chief 
information officers (CIO) at each of the DOD components.  DODD 8000.01 formally 
outlines the responsibilities of the heads of the DOD components as well as the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to appoint CIOs over their respective components as well as a 
joint community CIO (Department of Defense, 2009b).  It then becomes the 
responsibility of these CIOs to head an office which ensures their entity complies with 
DOD policies, to participate in forums concerning the governance of the DOD IE, and to 
train and retain IT personnel pursuant to the aforementioned responsibilities (Department 
of Defense, 2009b). 
DODD 8000.01 calls for a review of all IT investments to ensure continued 
compliance with the DOD enterprise architecture, IT standards, and other related policy 
requirements (Department of Defense, 2009b).  Finally, and critically, from a high-level 
viewpoint, DODD 8000.01 encourages the use of pilot programs, modeling and 
simulation, experimentation, and prototyping to reduce the risk of large high-risk 
projects.  Of note, however, is that such experimentation is not to be used in lieu of the 
formal acquisition processes when implementing a production version of the solution 
(Department of Defense, 2009b).   
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3. DODI 8320.02: Sharing Data, Information, and Information 
Technology Services in the Department of Defense 
DODI 8320.02 seeks to establish policies, processes and responsibilities to ensure 
the secure sharing of electronic data, information, and IT services within the DOD 
(Department of Defense, 2013b).  While the instruction applies to all data assets, 
information, and IT services within the DOD enterprise, in development, and in the larger 
community of interest (COI), it specifically does not apply to currently deployed systems 
for which modernization investment dollars have not been received (Department of 
Defense, 2013b).   
DODI 8320.02 requires that all DOD activities meet approved and applicable 
standards and specifications as found in the DOD IT Standards Registry (DISR), and 
tasks component heads and CIOs to ensure assets are in compliance with these standards 
or have an appropriate waiver in accordance with DODD 4630.05.  DODI also instructs 
that DOD IT assets protect data both in transit and at rest commensurate with the assets’ 
confidentiality level, mission assurance category, and level of exposure (Department of 
Defense, 2013b). 
4. DODI 8510.01: Risk Management Framework for DOD IT 
DODI 8510.01 replaced the previous DOD Information Assurance Certification 
and Accreditation Process and manages the cybersecurity risk for DOD IT from a total 
life-cycle perspective (Department of Defense, 2014c).  The policy goals behind DODI 
8510.01 are the establishment of an enterprise-wide RMF decision structure for 
cybersecurity in order to ensure consistency of the DOD IE with the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37.   
As an aspect of the RMF process, a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) must 
be developed and maintained to addresses all known vulnerabilities of IT systems, and 
continuous monitoring will be used wherever possible (Department of Defense, 2014c).  
The RMF process is to inform the DOD acquisition processes for all DOD IT, to include 
both DT&T and OT&E, but does not formally replace these processes.   
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Lastly, DODI 8510.01 encourages reciprocal acceptance of DOD and other 
federal agency and department IT system authorizations, with refusals reported to the 
DOD component senior information security officer.  The instruction notes that 
reciprocity “is an essential element in ensuring IT capabilities are developed and fielded 
rapidly and efficiently across the DOD Information Enterprise” (Department of Defense, 
2014c, p. 21).  Furthermore, reciprocity reduces the need for redundant testing. 
The development of an RMF for an IS and platform IT (PIT) closely follows the 
system development life cycle as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  Risk Management Framework for IS and PIT (from Department of Defense, 
2014c, p. 28) 
Through application of the methodical security implementation process outlined 
in DODI 8510.01, development of adequate security controls for IS and PIT appears a 
near certainty.   
5. DODI 8520.02: PKI and PK Enabling 
DODI 8520.02 prescribes the procedures and authorities necessary to establish 
and implement and DOD-wide PKI in order to enhance DOD IS through PKI-enabled 
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authentication, digital signatures, and encryption (Department of Defense, 2011).  Put 
simply, it is DOD policy that for all systems on the Non-classified Internet Protocol 
Router Network (NIPRNET) and the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNET) the DOD shall enable PKI use for digital signatures and encryption as well as 
for authentication.  Where applicable, the PKI will be implemented via the CAC in 
accordance with Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 201-1, 
Personal Identity Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors) (Department of 
Defense, 2011).   
DODI 8520.02 provides authority to the CIO to approve DOD hardware tokens 
other than the CAC for identity, authentication and signature.  It also instructs heads of 
the OSD and the DOD components to plan, program, budget, and test to support the 
evolution and continued efficacy of PKI within the DOD IE, and charges them to 
implement PKI on IS in the areas of network login, email, web servers, and devices.  
These requirements pertain equally to COTS and government-developed systems 
(Department of Defense, 2011) 
Furthermore, DODI 8520.02 specifies that the CAC will be the primary hardware 
token used for access to NIPRNET systems, and hardware tokens for the SIPRNET shall 
be used in accordance with national security systems (NSS) PKI (Department of Defense, 
2011).  Alternate tokens can be authorized on a case by case basis in circumstances where 
authentication certificates on the CAC cannot be used by various groups of users, and are 
approved via a service or agency-level certificate practice statement (CPS) (Department 
of Defense, 2011). 
D. DOD POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS 
Being a subset of the DOD, the USMC makes policy in accordance with the 
guidance, directives, and policies from the DOD, which often publishes strict security 
policy guidance regarding networks and communications.  As the USMC proponent for 
communications and networks, HQMC C4 sits on multiple working groups at the DOD 
CIO and DON CIO levels pertaining to mobility.  In addition to the C4 representative, 
numerous other stakeholders are usually present to include all of the other armed 
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services, DISA, and the NSA, totaling 10–20 persons present with others joining via 
teleconference.  For policy to become effective, the products of these working groups 
comes out as a Joint Task produced by action officers, and then sent up the chain of 
command from O-6 levels to Flag and General Officer levels.  At this point the service 
level organizations, such as C4, review the policy and submit feedback, suggested 
revisions, and comments.  After collating the returns from the various stakeholders, the 
DOD CIO office publishes new policy.  As the policy comes from the DOD CIO, the 
USMC does not always publish its own independent version, though C4 can if it so 
chooses (R. Anderson, interview with the author, April 29, 2013).   
DISA manages a listing of approved devices which all DOD entities may use in 
certain capacities which it review semi-annually or on demand if a new device is 
available which a unit wants to use.  This is the Unified Capabilities Approved Products 
List (UCAPL).  If a device is in line with the current UCAPL and existing security 
policy, a fairly rapid review process takes place which allows it to be implemented.   
When a new device or capability is available which the USMC desires to use but 
which does not fall within the current UCAPL and security policy, the USMC must first 
provide this input to its working groups.  In order for the product to be considered, the 
USMC must show that the technology is feasible and then request a waiver for a pilot 
program.  For the USMC, the waiver process starts as a conversation at the General 
Officer level between the Director C4, and the DOD CIO.  The DOD CIO will then push 
the waiver request to the Mobility Project Manager, and then the request will be pushed 
from action officer to action officer before approval.  This process can take months. 
Once the request is approved, the USMC can then begin testing its pilot program.  
Following success in the pilot, the USMC then requests and is ultimately granted a 
permanent waiver to allow it to operate its program until new policy is published.  
Concurrently, the DOD must then rescind its earlier policy, begin the policy formulation 
mark-up process between all of the stake holders, and then republish its policy. There is 
no specific set of criteria for how this process happens.  Instead, it is known informally as 
the way staff work is done at the Pentagon and within the larger DOD (R. Anderson, 
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interview with the author, April 29, 2013).  This process will be broken down step by 
step in later chapters for further analysis. 
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III. CASE OF FIST/LIGHTHOUSE 
As the primary example to elucidate current USMC uses of smartphone 
technology, this paper will portray the use of hand-held collection platforms through the 
case study of the Lighthouse/FIST projects at NPS.  This example is ideal in that it 
encompasses the duality of the core of this thesis: a cutting-edge system which presents 
real potential benefits, real risks, and which is in the throes of the policy approval 
process.  To clarify the distinction between the two systems, both FIST and Lighthouse 
were born of Longley’s 2010 NPS thesis.  While the Common Operational Research 
Environment (CORE) Lab at NPS retained cognizance and control over the Lighthouse 
version, keeping it in tighter line with DOD requirements and a central mission of social 
network analysis, the FIST project broke away and while also associated with NPS, is 
sponsored by the Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, and hosted by the 
Kestrel Corporation (Office of the DOD CIO, 2013).   
A. FIST OVERVIEW 
As Longley (2010) attested, the decision to adopt Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
(COTS) technology and use a rapid prototyping process has enabled the FIST team to 
move from a concept to a product in the field more quickly than would have been 
possible through the traditional DOD procurement process. The time saved by using 
COTS greatly reduced the currently arduous military procurement process, which lags far 
behind rapidly advancing technology (Longley, 2010). 
FIST is a field data-collection system which incorporates COTS smartphones, a 
customized software package, and a robust information management support system 
called FusionPortal with a deployable sensor fusion system known as FusionView 
(Longley, 2010).  As Longley (2010, p. 1) asserted, “FusionView enables real-time 
integration of disparate sensor systems that provides a powerful common operating 
picture critical for today’s decision makers.” Furthermore, using FusionPortal, data can 
be exported and analyzed using geospatial, geo-statistical, temporal, link, and social 
network analysis.  Use of the portal also facilitates the exchange of information with 
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external databases such as the Worldwide Civil Information Database (WCID), the 
International Studies of Violent Groups (ISVG), and the Combined Information Data 
Network Exchange (CIDNE) (Longley, 2010). 
Longley (2010) also described how “FIST facilitates ease of information 
collection through a user-friendly interface, and enables information to flow from the 
point of capture to analysts in near real-time regardless of location or physical 
proximity.” FIST is well suited for operations across a variety of environments, ranging 
from temperate to austere, and to support a plethora of mission sets such as 
counterinsurgency operations (COIN), counter-narcotic missions (CN), and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster response (HA/DR). “The predominant principle of FIST is the 
development of a user-friendly data collection tool (Collect) that utilizes automated 
information systems to enable unstructured data to be collected, processed, and structured 
for analysis and visualization in a variety of analytic packages” (Longley, 2010, p. 1). 
Through the use of this system, the USMC seeks to capitalize on all of the 
advantages of smartphones in the commercial and private sector and apply them to 
military information collection.  From the Marine Corps’ standpoint, its current 
philosophy of “Every Marine a Collector” blends well with FIST’s objective, which is a 
recognition of the need to equip as many people as possible in the operating environment 
to fully realize the potentials of a robust data-collection system (Longley, 2010). As 
Longley (2010) described, too often a collection capability is entrusted to the hands of a 
limited few, which restricts the scope and utility of data collection. Therefore, by 
designing FIST to operate on smartphones, harness the power of Web technologies, and 
present information on a lightweight visualization system, data collection, analysis, 
dissemination, and utilization can occur on a much broader scale than with previous 
systems (Longley, 2010).   
a. Use Potential in HA/DR Missions 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions impose 
significant challenges with regards to information technology and communication.  Relief 
agencies need massive amounts of information, which hinges on connectivity, to assess 
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the areas most affected, to tailor specific packages to local needs, and to gauge measures 
of performance and effectiveness.  Unfortunately for those seeking to ameliorate the 
situation, all too frequently the local infrastructure is destroyed (DR) or non-existent 
(HA), and the information they so desperately need is lacking due to a dearth of 
connectivity.  FIST offers an interim solution to this shortfall in that not only can the 
relief actors collect and view information through the portal, but smartphones could also 
be handed out to locals on the ground so that they might self-populate the portal.  
Needless to say a short anecdote should serve to illustrate the point.   
In the wake of the earthquake that devastated the impoverished country of Haiti in 
2010, the Kenyan-based company Ushahidi jump-started what became an international 
crowd-sourced relief effort which relied on texts coming from the people on the ground.  
Ushahidi was then able, after some substantial coordination efforts, to geotag and link the 
texts with footage from U.S. Army unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) (Tapscott & 
Williams, 2012, p. 4).  The end result was a near-real time geographical depiction of 
user-generated reports and needs to which any relief worker could subscribe via the 
public internet.  Better yet, the entire enterprise was accessible via smartphone (Tapscott 
& Williams, 2012, pp. 4–7).  This meant that although each relief organization likely had 
stove-piped information systems and hierarchical chains of command, all could access 
the list of needs and see visually where the resources were required without any need for 
formal information sharing or coordination.  From this small example, it becomes quite 
clear the use potentials for smartphone enabled technologies in HA/DR situations. 
b. Use Potential in COIN Missions 
As with the HA/DR situation described above, the potential uses of a FIST-like 
system in a COIN environment are myriad and obvious.  Collection of biographic and 
cultural data on areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events 
(ASCOPE) and political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure factors 
(PMESII) is tine-intensive and requires patrols physically going to the locales, which puts 
troops at risk.  After all the effort to collect the data, it might be entered into any number 
of databases (MarineLink, CIDNE, TIGR, Palantir, CPOF, etc.), and in any type of 
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format.  Worse yet is if the data, once collected, goes nowhere other than into a small 
notebook which is discarded at the end of the deployment.  FIST changes this mindset.  
By making data entry easier and more accessible than Biometric Automated Toolset 
(BAT), Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE), or Secure 
Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK) (current biometric and cultural data systems), and in 
concert with its lightweight and mobile nature, FIST justifies the risk to which troops are 
subjected during the collection phase and enable the population control which is so 
critical in a COIN environment.  Naturally, application for use in a COIN environment 
implies the need to incorporate classified technology to the application which introduces 
an additional subset of security concerns above and beyond those mentioned as part of 
general smartphone vulnerability. 
B. ISSUES ARISING FROM FIST’S INTRODUCTION, 
IMPLEMENTATION, AND USE 
Three years after Captain Longley’s initial idea to create a system to collect, 
process, and structure socio-cultural data in a streamlined fashion which would reduce 
time wasted by analysts in formatting data for analysis, and two years after he began 
work on the system as part of his thesis, Captain Longley demonstrated a working 
prototype during CARAT Thailand 10 in May 2010 (Roberts & Longley, 2013, p. 183).  
Along the way, Captain Longley was forced to change the name of the program from the 
human Terrain Analysis and Collection System (HTACS) to something more “vanilla;” 
Multi-modal Information Support Tool (MIST), a name which was already in use by 
other programs, and then finally to FIST (Roberts & Longley, 2013, pp. 179–182).  
Following a break with his former thesis co-advisor over private versus government 
ownership of the program, and the desire to use COTS and open-source technology, 
Captain Longley changed the name of the system from FIST to OpenFist, while the 
Kestrel Technology Group maintained control over the use of the name FIST and its 
proprietary software.  Following threats of legal action from Kestrel Technology Group, 
which had filed trademark rights to FIST, and the potential for an unending brand-name 
battle between the NPS lawyers, administrators, multiple military commands, and 
contractors, Longley again changed the name of the system to Lighthouse (Roberts & 
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Longley, 2013, p. 188).   From this contentious birth, two parallel systems (perhaps the 
divided assets of two divorced parents) emerged: FIST and Lighthouse.  At the point of 
their split, however, a desirable, working prototype had already been demonstrated at the 
Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand in May 2010 and in Singapore in August 2010 (Roberts 
& Longley, 2013, pp. 183–184).  This case study will pick up from that point and 
examine the divergent paths each system took in their quests for adoption into the DOD.   
Despite the introduction of the critical components of FIST in 2010, and 
especially in light of the previously discussed USMC strategy and policy documents 
which highlight the intent to move toward increased use of smartphones, the program 
remains stymied, and full implementation into and use by USMC ground forces is 
severely limited.  In an article from August 2012, Scarborough (2012a) documented the 
request for the Lighthouse from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).  
Interestingly, Scarborough annotated that while USSOCOM intended to purchase 
Lighthouse because of its ability to “collect data via mobile devices…the internet and 
radios” USSOCOM then planned to upload that data into the Palantir system.  At the 
conceptual level, this desire to link Lighthouse with Palantir for data analysis purposes 
appears counterintuitive since doing so would place FIST’s data and analysis capacity 
into the proprietary hands of Palantir.  Not surprisingly, the association of Lighthouse 
with Palantir brought the system into the on-going battle between Palantir and the 
Army’s intelligence data network and analysis tool, the Distributed common Ground 
System (DCGS) (Scarborough, 2012a). 
While the linkage between Palantir and Lighthouse caused immediate issues 
between supporters of the program of record DCGS and those of the COTS Palantir 
system, an attempt to decouple Lighthouse as a way to propel it forward also failed.  Due 
to Lighthouse’s ability to connect, interface, draw from and populate data into all manner 
of systems, in a meeting with DCGS program managers, representatives from the CORE 
Lab expressed interest in DCGS’ analytical systems to assist with the social network 
analysis research it conducts (Scarborough, 2012b).  Scarborough (2012b) also contended 
that one of the principal aims of the DCGS program managers in meeting with the CORE 
Lab was to convince them to integrate DCGS with Lighthouse.  Furthermore, 
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Scarborough highlighted that the DCGS implied they would provide DCGS platforms 
free of charge to NPS to enable the integration.  However, the lack of inclusion of COTS 
software into DCGS has resulted in Lighthouse remaining in fundamentally a research 
status at NPS, rather than a full-fledged system to support the warfighter; this despite the 
clear request for its capability from USSOCOM.  Hence, Lighthouse did not get stone-
walled by DOD or USMC policy per se, but rather by the internal politics and rivalries 
associated with program management in a resource constrained acquisition environment.  
While the zero-sum thought process of “any funding you receive is funding I lose,” is 
antithetical to the open nature of Lighthouse’s architecture, since it relies on COTS, that 
fact does not change the difficulties Lighthouse experienced in trying to integrate with 
existing systems.  It is of singular importance that Lighthouse as it exists today was 
barely able to survive the competing pressure from for-profit contractors which stood to 
lose a lot of money if the program remained solely government owned and operated.  
That it endured at all in any form is a testament more to the hard work and dedication of 
the entrepreneur than to any policies which encourage bottom-up innovation within the 
DOD (Roberts & Longley, 2013, pp. 186–188).   
Taking the more independent route, FIST attempted to market itself as a stand-
alone system with its own organic back-end analysis capability.  In this regard, FIST ran 
into DOD policy more directly, and more tellingly.  In a memorandum from November 
2013, the DOD CIO highlighted FIST as a commercially hosted capability operating 
contrary to DOD policy.  Specifically, the memorandum cited FIST as “operating an 
unauthorized node on commercial network infrastructure that intersects with the DOD 
Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network” (Office of the DOD CIO, 2013).  
Similar to the problems Lighthouse experienced with DCGS, in that there was little room 
for COTS to operate on a government-sponsored platform, FIST also ran afoul of DOD 
policy prohibiting the intersection of a commercial with a government network.  Also like 
Lighthouse, in the period where USSOCOM coupled Lighthouse with Palantir and 
experienced a backlash from program managers of DCGS, the CIO memorandum 
charged FIST with duplicating the information sharing capabilities which already resided 
in a designated enterprise solution, the All Partners Access Network (APAN) (Office of 
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the DOD CIO, 2013).  Specifically, FIST was found to be outside of compliance with 
regard to DODD 8100.04 DOD Unified Capabilities which outlines the requirements and 
process to obtain authority to operate on a DOD network (Office of the DOD CIO, 2013).  
DODD 8100.04 dictates the use of DOD enterprise services, and affords exceptions only 
when mission requirements and the best interests of the DOD necessitate them.   In 
accordance with DODD 8100.04, the FIST program was instructed to provide 
documentation with its authority to operate, a review by the Defense Information 
Assurance Security Working Group and the Defense Information Systems Network Flag 
Panel, and its GIG waiver request within 14 days or be subject to censorship and punitive 
action (Office of the DOD CIO, 2013).  The CIO outlined that APAN was the designated 
enterprise service for sharing unclassified information with multinational partners, 
NGOs, and other U.S. agencies (Office of the DOD CIO, 2013).  Therefore FIST had the 
option to either discontinue its work with the DOD, or to receive a waiver for the period 
required to migrate to the pre-existing DOD solution (Office of the DOD CIO, 2013). 
C. FIST SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND POLICY GAPS 
1. Mobile Application and Platform Assessment 
In an excellent analysis of FIST’s mobile application Gather and mobile platform, 
Google’s Android OS, VanAssche (2014) focused his examination on access protections, 
data encryption abilities, provisions for the secure storage of credentials, and the MDM 
controls. Through analysis of the access protection features, VanAssche (2014) 
determined that, for the Android platform, these features formed the lynchpin of the 
platform’s security architecture.  Therefore, circumventing the access protections allowed 
an attacker near total access to the device, while simultaneously negating or rendering 
irrelevant many of the other security features.  Furthermore, VanAssche (2014) found 
that the only substantial protection the FIST mobile application afforded against a 
determined attacker stemmed from a complex password based authentication system.  
Finally, with regard to access protection, VanAssche (2014) revealed that the collection 
and storage methods of the Gather application were insecure since the Gather application 
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did not enforce or require the use of the built-in access mechanisms despite the platform’s 
reliance on the access protection mechanisms as the basis of its security assumptions. 
Next, VanAssche (2014) examined FIST’s support for, and use of, various data 
encryption tools wherein he determined that the Android platform does indeed include 
“robust and extensible support for most modern encryption standards.”  What VanAssche 
(2014) also found was that despite the robust capability, the implementation encryption 
standards on the platform fell short in that individual application developers were free to 
specify which algorithms and modes their applications used.  This freedom is problematic 
from a security standpoint because the FIST platform preserves support compatibility for 
algorithms and modes that are no longer considered secure (VanAssche, 2014).  
Distressingly, the default choices for many of the platform’s encryption methods were the 
less secure methods, and thus VanAssche (2014) remarked that the application 
developer’s selection of encryption methods completely subordinated the security of an 
individual application’s use of the file encryption tools.   
In order to determine how well the platform conformed  to the policy set forth in 
DODI 8520.02, an examination of the platform’s mechanisms for secure storage of 
credentials and other secret keys is necessary.  VanAssche (2014) concluded that the 
Android platform offered only “limited support for the secure storage of shared secret 
credentials, such as symmetric encryption keys and account passwords, although it 
featured robust support for secure storage of PK cryptographic certificates.”  Indeed, 
VanAssche (2014) determined that the implementation of file system permissions and 
limited access provided the bulk of the platform’s protection for shared secret credentials.  
While this feature would seem to conform to the existing PKI/PK policy, VanAssche 
(2014) found that these protections offered only a token defense, and could be defeated 
easily through the use of a super-user account on the device.  Not surprisingly, Google 
has recommended the use of user-inputted secret keys, rather than reliance on shared 
secret credentials stored on the device itself for this very reason (VanAssche, 2014).  
With specific focus on the Gather application, while it met the security policy criteria on 
paper, in that it made sufficient use of the protected storage space provided by the OS for 
its sensitive data, VanAssche (2014) determined that this data was not protected by an 
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off-device secret key, and thus per the discussion above, remained vulnerable to 
exploitation through the use of a super-user account on the device. 
A critical element of the system, and in accordance with the DOD Mobile Device 
Strategy, is the concept of security through MDM controls.   VanAssche’s (2014) 
examination of the platform revealed severe deficiencies.  The platform documentation 
espoused extensive MDM controls, and touted that they could be incorporated into 
applications developed for the platform (VanAssche, 2014).  Unfortunately, as 
VanAssche (2014) discovered, these controls were centered on enforcement of access 
protection, and therefore offered limited ability to restrict the use of the device or destroy 
carried data after the fact if the device were discovered to be lost or stolen.  Given the 
substantial threat of loss or theft for a mobile device, particularly in a tactical 
environment, this shortfall represents a severe security shortcoming.  Thus while 
conformance to the existing security policy appears to afford a degree of protection, in 
practice the emphasis on strong access protection within the security model framework of 
the Android platform results in the simple reality that the Gather application cannot 
implement the requirements because it did not incorporate any of the potential MDM 
controls (VanAssche, 2014). 
2. Mobile Application Data Transport Assessment 
In verifying how the application fit within the policy framework provided by 
DODI 8510.01 and DODI 8320.02, several issues and vulnerabilities emerge.  
VanAssche (2014) found that the mobile application relied on the default Android SSL 
cipher suite priority, and thus used a cipher with known and demonstrated vulnerabilities 
as its default data interchange encryption method.  In addition to deficiency, review of the 
contents of the mobile application data interchange revealed the presence of two other 
significant security vulnerabilities.  As VanAssche (2014) remarked, every instance of 
data upload carried out by the Gather application contained the username and password 
for the FIST system of the user, and worse yet displayed the data upload in plain text.  
This defect guaranteed that an attacker able to defeat the cryptographic protections of any 
of the data interchanges enjoys full access to the FIST system (VanAssche, 2014).  
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Additionally, as VanAssche (2014) annotated, the data interchange used only the 
transmitted username and password to authenticate the data session, and therefore did not 
require or make use of a mechanism to verify the validity or “newness” of a session.  
Simply put, this vulnerability puts data upload to the FIST system from the Gather 
application at risk replay attacks, regardless of whether or not the attacker was able to 
defeat or interfere with the inherent cryptographic protections of the data stream itself 
(VanAssche, 2014). 
3. Analysis of Security Policy Gaps 
Following review of the security policy literature and comparison with the 
vulnerabilities discussed above with regards to the FIST mobile application, platform, 
and application data transport, it becomes clear that current policy is in fact adequate in 
that it requires proper protections of the DOD Information Enterprise.  How then, given 
the adequacy of the policy, can one explain the myriad vulnerabilities VanAssche (2014) 
noted in the system?  The simple answer is that the policy provides high level guidance 
which is relatively easy to meet on paper when compared against the practicalities of 
testing system vulnerability against evolving threats.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The lessons learned from the case of FIST/Lighthouse are clear.  Though the 
brainchild took two different routes to attempt to bring an asked for solution to the DOD, 
one government-owned and government operated, and the other contractor-owned and 
contractor-operated, neither has been wholly effective.  Plagued by difficulties ranging 
from inter-programmatic disputes, to official policy concerning mandated use of existing 
enterprise solutions, FIST and Lighthouse’s attempts to fulfill the originally intended 
purpose have fallen short.  Of course, the DOD should rightfully seek to protect its 
networks and to prohibit untested and therefore potentially vulnerability-increasing 
systems from having carte-blanche access.  However, the stymied efforts of FIST and 
Lighthouse also provide a sharp lesson to creative developers: the DOD is not the place 
for cutting edge smartphone-enabled software.  In particular, the requirements for 
managing the complex network of stakeholders, organizational interfaces, and resistance 
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point to the increased likelihood of failure for any stand-alone of bottom-up innovations 
within the DOD (Roberts and Longley, 2013, 186–189).  Those operating at the 
proverbial “pointy end of the spear,” in other words the innovative junior personnel at the 
war fighting level, have at best a limited understanding of the larger policy, approval, and 
acquisition process which can take years to master and comprehend (C. Longley, 
interview with the author, July 29, 2014).  In this sense, those best positioned to see the 
need and possibilities for the newest technologies are the least-suited to be able to do 
anything about affecting their implementation.   
Most interestingly about the agonizing experience of Lighthouse and FIST is that 
Longley’s initial idea in 2007, to use radio-linked smartphones to collect and analyze data 
from the field was novel at the time, and yet almost blindingly obvious at the time of this 
writing in 2014.  Indeed, perhaps many of the hurdles FIST and Lighthouse faced were 
precisely due to the revolutionary nature of the concept.  Certainly, in its initial stages 
Lighthouse found champions such as Lieutenant General John Mulholland whose 
“extensive field experience enabled him to immediately see its value and import” 
(Roberts & Longley, 2013, p. 187).  Yet, proposing such a concept today would hardly 
need to receive such support from on high, as it is seemingly mundane and hackneyed.  
From a DOD Policy and Acquisition standpoint, designed to tackle projects such as next 
generation air to air fighter design and warship creation, it might be hard to imagine an 
idea which is only three to five years old having been ahead of its time.  Yet, in the 
rapidly evolving field of smartphones and software it’s an entire generation of difference:  
a generational divide which means the difference between cutting edge and common-
place.  In the world of military conflict, these small leads can disproportionately affect 
the outcome of an engagement.  Balancing the requirements of GIG security while also 
incorporating technologies which afford a competitive advantage necessitates a review of 
the gaps in DOD policy and the policy formulation process.   
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E. SECURITY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Prior to examination of the process by which the DOD makes security policy, 
which will follow in chapter four, this chapter will discuss those specific policy changes 
needed to accommodate secure smartphone systems such as FIST into the DOD. 
1. FIST Policy Recommendations 
From his comprehensive security analysis, VanAssche (2014) provided the 
following recommendations to address his specific identified vulnerabilities of the FIST 
system: 
• Employ DNS WHOIS obfuscation to hide personnel and contact data 
• Employ DNSSEC technology 
• Remove specific identifying information from web server HTTP headers 
•  Remove OpenAtrium and Drupal identifying information in filenames 
and directories 
• Remove OpenAtrium and Drupal miscellaneous text files unrelated to 
functionality from public directories 
• Employ improved sanitization functions for FusionPortal data inputs 
• Implement Android device management controls within Gather app that 
enforces complex password device access protections 
• Ensure encryption algorithm and mode employed by Gather application 
does not contain cryptographic weaknesses 
• Ensure Gather application secure data files are protected by an off-device 
secret key 
• Override default Android SSL cipher priority list to ensure more 
cryptographically secure ciphers are used for data transport 
• Standardize Gather application data upload format to the same used in the 
web application, including session authentication tokens and remove use 
of username and password for authentication of data transmission 
(VanAssche, 2014, p. 77) 
It goes without saying that after correction of this initial list, further testing should 
be performed to determine the efficacy of the enhancement.  Moving beyond FIST, a 
baseline of security features for mobile applications in general merits discussion. 
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2. Mobile Application Security Policy in General 
Mobile application developers must understand and indeed question the 
underlying platform’s security assumptions, and subsequently engineer applications to 
conform to those security assumptions, rather than assuming away risk by failing to 
investigate and match the two.  Notably, as VanAssche (2014) attested, access 
protections, are a critical component of every mobile platform’s security assumptions, 
and hence in order to be considered secure applications which store or rely upon sensitive 
data stored within the device must maintained the integrity of access protections. 
Getting into the Design aspects of device and system creation, and as discussed 
earlier in this paper, mobile devices are frequently optimized first and foremost for, and 
indeed one of their principal appeals lies in, efficiency, rather than security (VanAssche, 
2014).  This simple truth means that the default settings in mobile platforms which 
support application development are generally not appropriate for a secure application.   
As such, these platform and system defaults must be examined in detail, tested, and often 
overridden in order to achieve total system security (VanAssche, 2014).  Mobile device 
policy must recognize this fact, and explicitly mention the need to validate and test such 
defaults. 
Finally, as mentioned previously, prudency demands that the theft or loss of a 
mobile device is all but assured.  Applications, and the policy which guides their 
development, must therefore keep this reality at the forefront during development, and 
whenever possible, should not require the storage of sensitive data on the device.  If such 
storage is necessary, protection mechanisms should rely on data stored the off the device 
(VanAssche, 2014). 
3. DOD Policy Reform Recommendations 
In noting that the existing policy was not inherently flawed, in that the nature of 
its language does indeed instruct taking adequate protection for mobile devices and their 
applications, this researcher does not intend to create the false notion that the policy is 
ideal.  Given the relative vagueness of policy documents, in that they are designed to 
apply holistically to the broad range of the DOD IE, and as compared to the highly 
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specific, individualized, and time-varied nature of security threats to mobile devices, it 
seems there are two overarching solutions to better govern device and application 
development and implementation.  Either policy must be so up-to-date and specific such 
that it covers all of the emerging threats in a timely manner as to allow the Acquisition 
process the lead time to develop modern products, or an entirely novel approach to 
development and testing must be implemented such that the vagueness of the policies is 
does not introduce risk or ambiguity. 
It is beyond the scope of this research to delve into a conceptual structure for a 
new development and testing approach, and though this topic will be addressed in a later 
chapter, such an approach would require a reconfiguration of the acquisition process, the 
policy process, and how the DOD interacts with industry and other elements of the 
federal community.  Within the DOD’s control however, is the possibility to introduce 
changes in the policy formulation process such that specific policy might be created in a 
timely enough manner as to allow the acquisition cycle the necessary lead to develop 
modern and secure systems.  It is to the redesign of the policy formulation process that 




This chapter will assess gaps in the current policy formulation process of the 
DOD by modeling the As-Is DOD Issuance process.  The methodology for this chapter 
takes the issuance approval process from the DOD Issuances website (Department of 
Defense, 2014a) and inputs it into the Savvion business process modeling software 
application.  Once the current process is modeled and gaps identified, this chapter will 
proceed to model a potential future process (To-Be).  The results of the two simulations 
will be presented in chapter five and then analyzed in chapter six. 
The Savvion process modeler is a “visual, easy-to-use tool that empowers [one] to 
design processes, run simulations, and store and retrieve processes from a central shared 
repository. To put it simply, people use Process Modeler to ‘articulate the way they think’ 
about their business” (Savvion, 2006, p. 5). The rationale for using Savvion’s process 
modeler is that Savvion was rated by Forrester Research as one of the leading business 
process modeling vendors, the Savvion software was free to obtain, functions well as a 
stand-alone system, and comes with an easy-to-use tutorial which familiarizes a new user 
with the software quickly (Savvion, 2006, p. 2).  The short learning curve and ease of use 
Savvion offers, coupled with multiple positive reviews placing it on par with other 
business process modeling software applications, made Savvion the logical choice for 
this research.  Furthermore, Savvion provides its results in a format conducive to 
exportation into Microsoft Excel.  Rapid transfer between the software’s output and an 
excel spreadsheet is highly desirable as Excel comes standard within the Microsoft Office 
Suite common to DOD systems, and because the KVA output, discussed in chapter five, 
requires use of Excel.  For a detailed explanation of how Savvion collects inputs, models 
them, and provides outputs, see Appendix F. 
A. AS-IS POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS  
In order to better understand the shortfalls of the current DOD policy formulation 
process, this research used the business process modeling software Savvion to produce a 
basic process flow.  In order to keep the process simple, so as not to be overly bogged 
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down in detailing the current (As-Is) process, several assumptions were made concerning 
personnel involved, costs, work times.  The key element in comparing the As-Is process 
to the To-Be (the future process to be discussed in the Recommendations Chapter) is 
consistency.  Therefore, while the assumptions are likely not all-inclusive, so long as they 
remain the same, the relative scale of the costs and benefits will remain within the same 
orders of magnitude.   
The current generic policy formulation process, as taken from the DOD Issuances 
Website (Department of Defense, 2014a), can be modeled as follows: 
1. Process Flow 
The process flow for a DOD Issuance occurs in five stages: 
• STAGE 1: DEVELOPMENT. Draft the issuance and coordinate internally 
within component. 
• STAGE 2: PRECOORDINATION. Get a precoordination edit from 
Directives Division (DD) and a legal objection review (LOR) from the 
Office of the General Counsel, DOD (OGC). 
• STAGE 3: FORMAL COORDINATION. Coordinate with external 
agencies. Adjudicate and ncorporate external agency comments in 
coordination with OGC. 
• STAGE 4: PRESIGNATURE. Send the final coordination package to DD 
for review and obtain a legal sufficiency review (LSR) from OGC. Also, 
obtain a security review from the Defense Office of Prepublication and 
Security Review (DOPSR). 
• STAGE 5: SIGNATURE AND POSTING. Send the final issuance to DD 
for posting to the Internet. 
There are multiple steps within each phase, which are now outlined in detail.  The 
percentages listed at the end of each step represent the percent of issuances which must 
go through that particular step in the model.   
Stage 1: 
• Component - Assign a Number to the new issuance: 100% of all 
issuances. 
• Component - Draft the Issuance: 100% of all issuances. 
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• Component – Determine External Coordination Requirements : 100% of 
all issuances. 
• Component – Prepare the SD Form 106 to begin the routing process: 
100% of all issuances. 
• Stage 2: 
• Directives Division – Precoordination Edit.  This edit involves a 
subjective review, a technical review, and a review of SD Form 106: 
100% of all issuances. 
• Component – Incorporation of Directives Division edits.  100% of all 
issuances. 
• Component – Requests OGC LOR.  100% of all issuances. 
• Component – submits edited issuance to the DD for posting. 100% of all 
issuances. 
• Directives Division – Post issuance to the portal.  100% of all issuances. 
• OGC – Legal Objections Review.  Percent Legally Objectionable 70%; 
Percent Not Legally Objectionable 30%. 
• If Legally Objectionable, Component revises the issuance.  
• Component – Requests Formal Coordination: 100% of all issuances. 
Stage 3: 
• Directives Division – Post Issuance to the Portal: 100% of all issuances. 
• External Agencies – Formal Coordination: 100% of all issuances. 
• Component – Adjudicate Coordination and Revise Issuance: 100% of all 
issuances. 
• Component – Request Presignature Review: 100% of all issuances. 
• Stage 4: 
• Directives Division – Presignature Review: 100% of all issuances. 
• Component – Review the Issuance. 100% of all issuances. 
• Directives Division – Post the Issuance to the Portal: 100% of all 
issuances.  
• OCG – Legal Sufficiency Review: 100% of all issuances.  Percent Legally 
Sufficient 75%; Percent Not Legally Sufficient 25%. 
• If Not Legally Sufficient, Component revises the issuance 
• Component – Request DOPSR Clearance: 100% of all issuances. 
• DOPSR – Security Review: 100% of all issuances. 
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• Component – Revision and Final Package Preparation: 100% of all 
issuances. 
Stage 5: 
• Office of the Secretary of Defense – Posting Review: 100% of all 
issuances. 
• Office of the Secretary of Defense – Signature: 100% of all issuances. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense – Dissemination: 100% of all issuances 
2. Assumptions 
• The DOD processed approximately 36 Directives in 2013.  Therefore, for 
the purposes of this project we will assume a twelve month work period, 
and will input a new directive beginning every 10 days for a total of 36. 
• Based off of the number of reviews and revisions, it is assumed that all of 
the Directives which reached the desk of the OSD were signed.  In reality 
this is not the case, as some may need to go back for revision.  As each 
revision would potentially require further Legal Sufficiency Review and 
possibly Clearance review, this research omitted this re-work loop in favor 
of simplicity.   
• Other than for the SecDef and his Under Secretary, military pay scales 
were used for all other workers, including the OGC.   
• All Directives which made it out of the internal component review would 
eventually be processed (i.e. none were declared unnecessary and 
scrapped during the process). 
• Assumed Legally Objectionable Review Percentages (70/30) and Legally 
Sufficient Review Percentages (75/25). 
• Each actor in this process has a scheduled amount of time to complete 
work on the issuance.  This scheduled time differs markedly from the time 
required to perform the work.  As such, an inbox for each actor (with a 
billed rate of $0) was created to account for this structural delay. 
• Assumed two days (written as hours within the model to allow for faster 
run times) for the component to turn around revisions. 
3. Employees and Pay Rates 
The As-Is process entails several primary action agencies, each with an associated 
number of employees and hourly rates.  As will be explained in the following section, to 
save time running the simulation eight hour work days were compressed into one ‘hour’ 
of simulation.  As such, a daily pay rate for an employee is translated into an hourly 
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charge when entered into the model (see Appendix F for how this information is entered).  
Furthermore, the pay rates are designed to portray relative costs of the model as 
compared to other alternatives, and thus the personnel costs include only base pay rates, 
and do not include additional benefits such as housing and subsistence allowances.  Of 
particular note is that the employees and hourly rates are estimates, and are reflected 
below, and the theoretical basis for adding in costs stems from the previous KVA 
discussion as a means to translate utilization of human capital.   
a. Component 
At the component level, an action officer is an O-4.  To obtain signatures or prior 
to routing to the Directives Division requires an O-5 review and an O-6 approval.  
Therefore, the O-4 does 85% of the work, the O-5 does 10% and the O-6 does 5%. 
The composite rate per work day assumes a 40 hour work week, for 244 work 
days (which is the number of non-weekend work days minus the expected days off  
military personnel typically receive for federal holidays [16]) a year. 
For simplicity, it is assumed all officers are relatively junior in grade, therefore 
their monthly pay will be assumed to be as indicated by Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  Component Hourly Rate Calculation 
Thus one sees that for the component, their cost is roughly $338.5 per work day.  
As previously mentioned, such that the modeling software works more quickly and 
cleanly, the translation of work days into work hours was used.  Translating the rate for 
one work day into the model, this researcher will charge at $338.5 per “hour” for the 
component.  This conversion will be used for all subsequent pay rates in that one work 
days’ worth of weighted pay will equate to one hourly charge in the model. 
Level Monthly Annual Daily Rate Weighted Avg
O-4 (over 10) 6,593.10 79117.2 324.2508197 275.6131967
O-5 (over 16) 7,974.00 95688 392.1639344 39.21639344
O-6 (over 20) 9,625.20 115502.4 473.3704918 23.66852459
338.4981148
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b.  Directives Division 
It can also be assumed that the work at the directives division is again done 
primarily by a mid-grade O-4 and that a mid-grade O-5 reviews the directive briefly 
following the O-4’s edit. Therefore, as depicted in the weighted average of Figure 10, it 
will be assumed the O-4 does 90% of the work, and the O-5 does 10% for this actor. 
 
Figure 10.  Directives Division Hourly Rate Calculation 
Thus the charge will be $331 per hour for the Directives Division. 
c. Office of the General Counsel 
The model will assume that the Legal Review is conducted primarily by an O-5 
with O-6 oversight.   Therefore the O-5 will do 85% of the work, and the O-6 will do 
15%.  Using the same scales as before the pricing for the Office of the General Council 
(OGC) is shown in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11.  Office of the General Counsel Hourly Rate Calculation 
Thus the OCG rate is charged at $404.34 per hour.  
d. DOPSR 
It will be assumed the work at the security office is done primarily by an O-4 with 
some supervision from an O-5.  Their pricing therefore will be identical to the Directives 
Division.  Thus the model will charge $331 per hour for the DPOSR. 
Level Monthly Annual Daily Rate Weighted Avg
O-4 (over 10) 6,593.10 79117.2 324.2508197 291.8257377
O-5 (over 16) 7,974.00 95688 392.1639344 39.21639344
331.0421311
O-5 (over 16) 7,974.00 95688 392.1639344 333.3393443
O-6 (over 20) 9,625.20 115502.4 473.3704918 71.00557377
404.344918
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e. Office of the Secretary of Defense 
A valid assumption is that the secretary himself does not do the majority of the 
work in reviewing the directives that come into his office, and that he has senior staff 
doing almost all of that work.  It can be assumed then, that an O-6 does 80% of the work 
in the OSD, an O-8 does 10%, the Under Secretary for Defense Policy (USD (P)) will do 
5%, and the Secretary himself does about 5%.  Figure 12 displays this pricing model. 
 
Figure 12.  Office of the SecDef Hourly Rate Calculation 
Thus the OSD will charge $520.6 per hour. 
f. External Agencies 
By external agencies, we mean other components as well as other agencies with 
the DOD (DIA, DISA, etc.).  We will assume rank equivalence with the drafting 
component, and as such, the hourly rate is the same $338.5 per hour as charged for the 
component. 
4. As-Is Process Model 
The As-Is process was put into the Savvion modeling simulator.  Of note, in order 
to ensure the software did not take an inordinate amount of time to run a simulation, a 
simple conversion was made in that an entire eight-hour work day was modeled as one 
hour.  Thus a work time of five hours in the Savvion model represents five, eight-hour 
work days.  As an additional note, due to the scheduled delays in the timeline per Table 3 
of DOD instruction 5025.01 (Department of Defense, 2013a), zero-cost “inboxes” were 
added to the model to account for the delays without adding massive work time.  In other 
words, while the OGC might have ten days to provide the Legal Objection Review to the 
Level Monthly Annual Daily Rate Weighted Avg
O-6 (over 20) 9,625.20 115502.4 473.3704918 378.6963934
O-8 (over 26) 13,647.30 163767.6 671.1786885 67.11786885
USD(P) 13,775.00 165,300 677.4590164 33.87295082
SecDef 16641.67 199,700 818.442623 40.92213115
520.6093443
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component, the OGC does not in all likelihood perform ten, eight-hour days’ worth of 
work on the issuance.  The no-cost inboxes account for the time incurred while allowing 
manipulation of the actual time spent on the legal review.  Figure 13 shows the simplified 
As-Is model. 
  
Figure 13.  As-Is Savvion Process Model 
What becomes immediately clear is the hierarchical nature of the process flow 
wherein only one actor works on an issuance at a time, and where all changes and edits 
must go back to the originator to be enacted.  While the simulation is no doubt somewhat 
simplified from the actual process, it is hard to believe indeed that simplification would 
lengthen the issuance process.  Therefore, with respect to the fit between current the 
policy formulation process and the evolving technologies inherent in smartphone and 
mobile technologies, it becomes obvious that no matter the type of policy, be it security 
or otherwise, the hierarchical model breaks down when rapidity is desired.  Indeed, if the 
hierarchical model was the pinnacle of fit for an Industrial Age organization, the 
requirements for using mobile devices and the fundamental mismatch we witness 
between our policies and what they govern should convince us that we are in the throes of 
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transition to an Information Age organization.  In that sense, what is required as we move 
forward is the use of collaboration and design.  Indeed, this type of structure represents 
the ideal target for BPR and Design Thinking (for a detailed discussed of BPR and 
Design Thinking, see Appendix E). 
B. TO-BE POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS  
Taking the theories of BPR and Design Thinking into account, the policy 
formulation change effort sought to achieve time and cost savings within the process, 
while making it more collaborative and thereby more responsive to the turbulent 
environment of software and mobile devices.  The process redesign goals are as follows: 
1. Business Process Reengineering Goals 
• Reduce wait time by at least 90%, ensuring that each activity with wait 
time is reduced by at least 50%. 
• Reduce duration by at least 25%. 
• Reduce utilization for OGC, Component and Directives Division by at 
least 50%. 
• Increase throughput from 36 issuances per year to 50 issuances per year 
(or higher). 
Of note, reducing costs is not in the list of BPR goals.  This is intentional and 
measured.  Certainly the government always seeks to reduce costs in everything that it 
does, and this has never been truer than in eras of fiscal constraint.  However, reducing 
cost cannot and should not be a goal of this change effort because of the slippery and 
elusive nature of that goal.  In other words, even if the BPR reduced costs by 50%, could 
the argument not be made that the government would still prefer to have reduced it by 
75%, or even 90%?  As such, the extreme of this goal suggests that in fact cutting costs is 
easy: eliminate the entire process altogether; or even more radically, cut all government 
costs by eliminating the government!  This somewhat pedantic argument is presented 
merely to explain that while surely attempts to reduce costs are necessary and should be 
encouraged, cost reduction cannot be one of the primary goals where government is 
concerned since from an existential perspective one must accept that the cost of doing 
business, in this case of processing and publishing policy, is a necessary evil, and 
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certainly better than the alternative (accepting massive risk and having complete dis-unity 
of effort by publishing nothing at all).   
2. Future Process (To-Be) 
In order to achieve such drastic process improvements, it becomes clear why BPR 
is required, and why Lean or Six Sigma improvements, also known as continuous process 
improvements (CPI), will be insufficient.  In other words, radical redesign of the process 
is the only means which can accomplish the assigned goals.  In this instance, the 
underlying theoretical construct for the redesign lay in the field of design thinking, which 
focuses heavily on collaboration, creativity, rapid prototyping, and empathy with the end 
user (for a full discussion of the design thinking process, see Appendix E).  At the same 
time, it is understood that to achieve a realistic process, the legal and political machinery 
which regulates the DOD cannot be assumed away (i.e. one cannot presume the entire 
DOD structure would be modified to achieve process improvements for releasing 
issuances).  In this manner, and in accordance with best practices and research from the 
field of Change Management, successful adoption and implementation of the change 
effort necessitates that only certain aspects of the process be redesigned.  
Taking design thinking into account, one notices the completely sequential nature 
of the process.  DOD Issuances move from one stove-piped piece of the hierarchy to 
another in a logical, deliberate fashion.  Each entity had time to review it, make edits, and 
then send it back to the component for revisions before the issuance moved on to the next 
stage in its life cycle.  It was precisely this “sequentialism” that the BPR effort sought to 
destroy as it adds needless delays and places considerable burden on the component in 
terms of revision.   
The To-Be process incorporates the collaborative emphasis from design thinking.  
While the component still writes the initial draft of the issuance, several things change.  
First, the goal of writing an issuance is not to “get it right” the first time, but rather to 
provide a template off of which the collaborative process can begin.  Thus the component 
will spend a shorter time drafting the issuance.   
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Next, there is no need for the Directives Division to pre-edit the issuance for a 
five day window following which the Directive Division must post the issuance to the 
portal.  Under a collaborative model, the whole objective is the push the issuance into the 
portal as rapidly as possible to allow the creativity of the collective (i.e. all concerned 
stakeholders) the maximum time to interact with it.  Thus, the component can post the 
issuance, and rather than the issuance being pulled off and then re-posted each time, once 
posted to the portal, the issuance will remain posted.  In the same manner as a 
GoogleDoc, version control will be accomplished through the time-stamping of edits 
such that the issuance is modified in real-time.  Furthermore, an RSS feed would alert 
each of the various stakeholders to the presence of a new issuance on the portal.  This 
removes the need for the component to determine formal coordination requirements as 
well as the need to request formal coordination.  The “Alert” method is preferable 
because rather than rely on the component to estimate which stakeholders might care to 
be involved (this was the “Determine Formal Coordination Requirements” step from the 
As-Is), involvement is assumed from all stakeholders (as naturally all would have access 
to the portal), and those who have no stake can simply “opt-out” by not making any 
modifications.   
What then follows is a period of intense and simultaneous collaboration.  This 
period would be messy as organizations (to include legal and the directives division 
which would act as overseers to ensure the process stays on track and within its scope) 
modify and debate the various merits of the issuance.  Such contentiousness is desirable 
as it bypasses the formality of non-concurrence in that each entity is encouraged to make 
modifications rather than simply accept or reject the proposed issuance.  This stage is 
kept necessarily short so that the stakeholders maintain focus on the issuance at hand. 
Following the collaborative stage, the component works to clean up the issuance, 
and the more scripted, formalization of the issuance takes place.  The component will 
make any touch ups and request a final, formal legal review.  The OGC will perform a 
single legal review, in place of the previous Legal Objection Review and the Legal 
Sufficiency Review.  The logic for a single review vice two is that the OGC monitored 
the issuance development and provided feedback throughout the collaborative stage. 
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Thus only a single legal review is required, and that on a reduced timeline.  In similar 
fashion, the DOPSR performs its security review as before, but on a reduced timeline 
given that they were also involved during the collaborative stage. 
Finally, the Office of the SecDef performs its review, signs, and disseminates the 
issuance.  As previously mentioned, since the structure of the DOD will not change to 
accommodate this one process, the Office of the SecDef’s interaction will remain 
somewhat hierarchical and sequential to ensure adequate oversight and to remain within 
the framework of Executive and Congressional legislation.  Finally, the last modification 
made was to increase the number of personnel at the component and OGC from one each 
to four and three, respectively.   
Thus the To-Be process would look more like this: 
Stage 1: 
• Component –  Assign a Number to the new issuance: 100% of 
all issuances.
• Component –  Draft the Issuance: 100% of all issuances.
• Component – Post Issuance to interactive web Portal
Stage 2: 
• Directives Division, OGC, DOPSR, and External Agencies – Input and
Editing.  100% of all issuances
• Component – Collation of edits.  100% of all issuances.
• Component – Requests OGC Legal Review.  100% of all issuances.
• OGC – Legal Review.  Percent pass review 75%; Percent fail review 25%.
• If revisions required, Component revises the issuance.
• Component – Requests DOPSR Clearance: 100% of all issuances.
Stage 3: 
• DOPSR – Security Review: 100% of all issuances.
• Component – Revision and Final Package Preparation: 100% of all
issuances.
Stage 4: 
• Office of the Secretary of Defense – Posting Review: 100% of all
issuances.
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• Office of the Secretary of Defense – Signature: 100% of all issuances. 
• Office of the Secretary of Defense – Dissemination: 100% of all issuances. 
3. Additional Assumptions (for the To-Be Model) 
• A new portal might have to be created that allows for interactive, real-time 
modification to issuances 
• Stakeholders have designated personnel to monitor the issuances RSS feed 
and to provide input and edits absent formal coordination requests 
4. To-Be Process Model 
Based off of the goals and assumptions listed above, the To-Be Model is focused 
on enabling collaboration rather than stove-piping work between organizations.  While to 
the lay-viewer the models might not look entirely different, the key area to note is the one 
with the red circle around it in Figure 14.  It is in this area that the period of intense 
collaboration occurs. Comparing the As-Is with the To-Be models one notices that after 
the collaborative phase the models look relatively similar.  Again, as described previously 
and in accordance with change management theory, the latter half of the To-Be process 
was left hierarchical to both temper the strong reaction against the change effort and in 
recognition of the fact that the entire structure of the DOD is unlikely to change in order 
to ameliorate the issuances process. 
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Figure 14.  To-Be Savvion Process Model 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented two models, an As-Is simulation of the current DOD 
Policy-making process, and a To-Be process, and relied on the Savvion process modeler 
tool to build and simulate them.  The impetus for radical process redesign can be found in 
BPR theory (as described in Appendix E), major difference between the two models 
stemmed from the theoretical backdrop of rapidly iterative collaborative creation 
contained within Design Thinking (also discussed in Appendix E).  The following 
chapter will discuss and compare the results from the two models.     
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V. SIMULATION DATA AND RESULTS 
This chapter will discuss the results obtained from simulating the As-Is and To-Be 
models of the DOD policy formulation process.  The full tables of the results can be 
found in Appendices A through D, and therefore only results of import will be elucidated 
in the following discussion.   
A. AS-IS SAVVION OUTPUT 
Running the As-Is simulation for 36 issuances (the number published by the DOD 
in 2013 according to the DOD Issuances Website), yields the data in Appendix A.  
Several results are of particular note.  First, the total duration of 703:15:00 translates to 
703.25 work days to complete the 36 issuances.  More simply put, the current DOD 
Issuances process holds the potential to require two years’ worth of work days to 
accomplish a single year’s worth of work.  A second look at Appendix A shows the 
“Waiting Time” column is nearly entirely red, representing massive delays.  Since only 
one actor may work on an issuance at a given time, and assuming that an office does not 
find or task extra people to work on issuances, given that they have myriad other tasks to 
accomplish, massive delay builds up on issuances in the queue while entities wait for a 
previous issuance to be published.  Lastly, under the “Utilization” column of the 
“Performers Queue Length and Utilization” section, one also notices the high utilization 
rates for the component and the Directives Division (91.57% and 70.17%, respectively).  
While at first glance one might think high utilization represents efficiency, taken into 
context that the actors have other tasks, it becomes readily apparent how harmful high 
utilization can be.  In other words, if a person at the component spends 90% of his/her 
time processing issuances, they do not have time for anything else, to include going to 
meetings, or conducting annual training.   
Other aspects of the process as modeled are in line with expectations.  For 
example, the Office of the SecDef is shown at approximately 11% utilization.  Far from 
representing inefficiency, this value is if anything too high.  One would not expect the 
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Secretary of Defense to spend more than 10% of his time reviewing DOD Issuances, 
particularly given his duties on the National Security Council. 
B. AS-IS KVA OUTPUT 
In an effort to measure the utilization of human capital the work times and 
associated costs from the Savvion output in Appendix A were translated into a measure 
of knowledge value added (KVA) using principles from the theory of KVA found in 
Appendix E.  The most stirring results from this output can be found in the utilization 
percentages.  The directives division utilization came to 195.2%, while the component’s 
utilization was a startling 1036.4%.  In other words, it should come as no surprise that 
under the current model it takes over two years to accomplish one year’s worth of work, 
since the main actor responsible for generating and doing most of the work on an 
issuance (the component) is supremely over-worked.  Similarly the main interface 
between the component and the larger policy-making process (the directives division) is 
also over-utilized, which further contributes to the delays noted in the As-Is Savvion 
output.   
To determine the generated value to the process of the human capital in the 
directives division and the component, one can divide the revenue generated by an 
activity by total revenue generated in the process (column R) in Appendix B.  Doing the 
same (dividing the cost for an activity by the total cost of the process) for costs produces 
column S of Appendix B.  These two columns on the far right side of Appendix B 
provide a side-by-side comparison for the value and cost of an activity relative to the 
entire process.  For instance, the comparison shows that the “Prepare the Final Package” 
step generates nine percent of the value in the process, and comprises four percent of the 
total cost.  Rather than delve into minutiae for each step in the process, the critical 
comparison is in the revenue and costs associated with the two over-utilized actors: the 
directives division and the component, particularly as compared to lesser used actors, 
such as the OGC.  By adding up the revenue and costs percentages from columns R and S 
for each actor, the As-Is revenue versus cost is illuminated by Figure 15. 
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Figure 15.  As-Is KVA Value versus Cost 
What becomes immediately clear is that the component and the directives division 
produce 70% of the value, and incur fully 90% of the total cost.  By contrast, the Office 
of the General Counsel generates almost 20% of the revenue for only 5% of the total cost.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that the total return on knowledge (ROK) as compared to 
the total cost to benefit ratio, found in columns P and Q, respectively, is comparatively 
low at 32% and 31%, respectively (essentially 1:1).   
C. TO-BE SAVVION OUTPUT 
Following the redesign of the policy formulation process shown in Figure 14, the 
Savvion output produced the results shown in Appendix C.  Most notably, whereas the 
duration in the As-Is model was over 703 days for one year’s worth (36 instances) of 
work, the To-Be model took only 522 days to process two years’ worth (72 instances) of 
issuances.  Similarly, despite the doubled workload, the total cost for the To-Be model 
was only $409,294.8, as compared to the $ 573,632.21 for the As-Is model.  Also of note 
was the elimination of wait time in the To-Be model.  Finally, the utilization percentage 
for the component was reduced from 91.57% in the As-Is to 33.6% in the To-Be model, 
while the directive division’s utilization was reduced to 6.89% from is As-Is high of over 
70%. 
D. TO-BE KVA OUTPUT 
The KVA results from the To-Be simulation can be found in Appendix D.  
Notable results are the realignment of total activity time in the component from   
1036.4% to 37.1%, and for the directive division from 195.2% to 6.9%.  The OGC saw a 









activity time increased to 20.7%.  Significantly, Figure 16 displays the changed value 
versus cost generation (using the same process as generated Figure 15 above).    
 
Figure 16.  To-Be KVA Value versus Cost 
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the ROK versus the cost to benefit ratio 
improved by an order of magnitude to 128% and 8%. 
E. RESULTS OF THE POLICY FORMULATION CHANGE EFFORT 
SIMULATION 
Comparing Appendices A and C yields the following results as compared with the 
BPR goals introduced in chapter four: 
• Reduce wait time by at least 90%, ensuring that each activity with wait 
time is reduced by at least 50%. 
• Overall wait time has been reduced by 100%, largely due to the 
“portal” style of issuance creation and addition of minimal 
personnel in two key areas:  The Component and Office of the 
General Council.   
• Reduce duration by at least 25%. 
• Duration was reduced from 703.25 days to 522.25 days, or a total 
percentage of 25.3%. 
• Reduce utilization for OGC, Component and Directives Division by at 
least 50%. 
• OGC utilization was reduced by a total of 41%, Directives 
Division was reduced by 97%, and the Component utilization was 
reduced by 96%.     
• Increase throughput from 36 to 50 (or higher). 
• Actions per year were increased from 36 to 72, surpassing the 50 









F. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This chapter presented and compared the results from the two Savvion models 
contained in Appendices A through D.  Overall, the To-Be model met all of its BPR 
goals.  The change effort reduced total duration by 25% and achieved roughly 30% cost 
savings while concomitantly eliminating wait time and improving percentage utilization 
for the directives division and the component by over 95%, in spite of a 100% increase in 
the number of issuances processed.  The next chapter will analyze the reasons for such 
dramatic process improvement in light of the original BPR goals. 
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VI. POLICY PROCESS ANALYSIS 
A. GENERAL ANALYSIS 
Regarding the accomplishment of the BPR goals, there is room for discussion and 
analysis on why the change effort achieved such drastic results.  Therefore, each 
improvement will be addressed in turn. 
1. Reduction of Wait Time 
In the To-Be model wait time was entirely eliminated.  This meant that no 
issuance sat in an inbox waiting for an actor to take action on it because that actor was 
already working on an earlier issuance.  In short, previously identified bottlenecks at the 
component and the Directives Division were neutralized.   
2. Reduction of Duration 
The reduction of bottle necks and wait time, and the simultaneous nature of the 
collaborative revision process introduced in the To-Be model, improved the duration to 
process an increased number of issuances markedly.  In this sense, the principle of the 
design process to fail early to achieve success sooner is precisely what allowed the model 
inputs for the collaborative stage to be more rapid than in the As-Is model.  By 
introducing more freedom, and more actors (via the External entities), a more 
comprehensive and more complete issuance is realized earlier in the process.   
3. Reduction of Utilization 
Naturally the reason for the reduction in utilization of the directives division is 
obvious: the division was all but eliminated in the To-Bo model and replaced by an 
interactive web-portal approach to policy-making.  This interactive approach is also the 
reason behind the reduction in utilization for the component.  In the As-Is model the 
majority of the work, such as writing the issuance, coordinating with external entities, 
editing, submitting for reviews, re-editing, and preparing the final package, fell to the 
component.  In effect, the component did all the leg work to create the issuance, and then 
had to do all the work if some other entity disagreed with something or required changes.  
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The directives division was acting as a middle man in this whole exchange, and thus 
more work (particularly for the component) was generated purely by its existence.   In 
moving to a more collaborative process via the To-Be model the onus to make changes 
falls increasingly on the stakeholders collectively, rather than a single point of failure: the 
over-worked action officer at the component.  Similarly, since the OGC is involved 
earlier in the process as well, items which would likely be legally objectionable or be 
cause for legal insufficiency are addressed earlier, which translates to reduced time spent 
in legal review.  Again, it is the collaborative nature and early involvement of the 
stakeholders which provides for this improvement. 
4. Increased Throughput 
The reduction in wait time coupled with the decreased utilization made for 
increased throughput in the To-Be model as compared to the As-Is.  Indeed, doubling the 
number of actions taken while also reducing the total duration by over 25% is a result 
with which any organization could be satisfied.  However, this is not to say the DOD 
should produce more issuances just because it has the potential to do so.  Rather, the 
implication is that due to the decreased time, decreased utilization and increased rapidity 
with which a given issuance might be produced, the policy formulation process under the 
To-Be model would actually be able to keep pace with cutting-edge technology.  This 
responsiveness is the true value of the To-Be model over the As-Is model.  As discussed 
in the FIST/Lighthouse case study in chapter three, it is unreasonable to expect 
contemporary policy to remain valid with every advancement in technology, especially 
given the pace of change in the information age.  Thus, the goal should be a responsive 
policy formulation process which can produce prudent policy guidance, based on relevant 
stakeholder input, in such a manner as to encourage the proliferation of novel ideas, and 
facilitate their rapid creation, adoption, and implementation into the force.  Nowhere is 
will the effect of such rapid incorporation be more keenly felt than at the proverbial “tip 
of the spear,” the ground combat forces.   
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5. Reduced Costs 
While reducing costs was not one of the original BPR goals, the change effort 
also realized cost savings. Though counterintuitive, the addition of personnel to the OGC 
and the component actually reduced total costs through the elimination of wait time.  
Additionally, the implicit addition of personnel to the process via increased stakeholder 
participation (identified in the more substantial involvement of external actors) also 
serves to keep costs down in much the same manner.   
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADOPTION OF SMARTPHONES AND 
ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGIES 
By simulating the process whereby policy is drafted this research aimed to make 
the policy formulation process more inclusive of myriad stakeholders and more reactive 
to rapidly evolving situations which require published policy.  As discussed in previous 
chapters, use of smartphone technologies, and in particular at the tactical level wherein 
network security is critical to protecting lives and insuring mission success, is a prime 
example of one such situation.  Marines will go to just about any length to accomplish 
their mission.  It is one of the hallmarks of the Marine Corps that its personnel will give 
that last full measure of devotion in order to succeed.  It also means that bringing new 
technologies into ground combat units requires clear and up-to-date policy to govern their 
use.  As presented in chapters two and three, despite the identified need for the 
technologies and encouragement for their use form the highest levels of the DOD, and as 
the case study of FIST and Lighthouse attested, there remain a plethora of concerning 
security gaps which should give cause for pause before tens of thousands of Marines are 
equipped with and allowed to use these systems in combat.   The solution identified in 
this research was to expedite and make more comprehensive the policy which governs 
these systems on the assumption that such policy, in contrast to the technically correct but 
overly generic and insufficient contemporary policy, would thereby better protect the 
networks and lives of the troops.   
At the conceptual level the two simulations represent a move from a more 
Industrial Age policy-making process, driven predominantly by the needs of the 
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hierarchy, to an Information Age approach driven by the COI and underwritten by 
collaboration.  The improvements to the process as identified in chapter five and assessed 
earlier in this chapter are not an indictment of the As-Is model.  Indeed this model has 
performed its function admirably in the past.  However, the current process was not 
designed with the realities of the Information Age in mind, and the process is deliberately 
tightly controlled, and intentionally non-responsive as a means to ensure total hierarchical 
oversight.  The gains realized in the To-Be model are possible through the advent of web-
enabled interactive, real-time portals that permit collaborative policy creation among the 
various stakeholders.  This process is at once both more fluid and reactive to changing 
situations as well as more rapid.  Indeed if any terms could be used to describe the 
Information Age they would be interconnectivity, fluidity, and rapidity.  The DOD needs 
such a process to ensure unity of effort across its many functions, of which its IE is 
certainly one of the most critical.    
C. IMPLEMENTING THE TO-BE PROCESS IN THE DOD 
Based on the changes to the policy formulation process proposed in chapter four, 
the true challenge in realizing a more responsive process is implementing it within the 
DOD.  As discussed, the heart of the To-Be simulation was the collaborative web portal 
which allowed simultaneous real-time feedback, correction, edits, and review.  Software 
applications such as SharePoint or Blackboard permit this type of interaction from a 
technological standpoint.  Indeed, the decision to base the To-Be model around such 
software is a direct reflection of this technical reality.  Rather, as the field of change 
management discussed in Appendix E suggests, the primary obstacle to a more 
collaborative process will be the physical organizational hierarchy of the DOD and its 
organizational culture.  The necessity to be inclusive vice exclusive in the design and 
review process is anathema to the hierarchical nature of DOD development, review, and 
approval. 
 In order to keep the change effort to a manageable scope, such that it would not 
be rejected at face value upon initial introduction, large parts of the policy formulation 
process would be left unchanged.  The OGC, DOPSR, and SecDef would retain their 
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responsibilities and authorities for review and approval, albeit they would be engaged in 
the process earlier.  The directives division would not be wholly eliminated, but would be 
downsized and act in a more advisory and review capacity rather than as a middle man.  
Retaining these elements of the previous process serves to mollify those elements of the 
organization which might react most vehemently to the change on the fear that they were 
losing influence and power. 
The next obstacle to tackle would be the inclusion of not only other DOD and 
Federal entities but players from the larger community of interest.  An open web portal, 
wherein invitations are extended to stakeholders from the commercial and business 
sectors, as well as the academic and research oriented sectors, represents a major shift in 
ideological viewpoint for the DOD.  As Kotter (2002, Kindle location 375) suggested, of 
the many factors required to spur an organization to accept change, the DOD needs to 
feel the sense of urgency regarding reformation of its policy process and would then need 
to see short-term successes.  In that vein, perhaps the urgency to reform the process writ-
large does not yet exist, since the DOD publishes many policy documents which are not 
tied to rapidly advancing technology.  However, as illustrated in chapters two and three, 
the DOD policy process is significantly out of sync with smartphone systems, given the 
strategic guidance which advocates their adoption as compared to the stalled efforts of 
the types of systems asked for, in this case FIST and Lighthouse.  To that end, this 
research recommends amending the policy formulation process specifically for network 
and software-related systems for which rapidity of publication can be the difference 
between cutting edge and obsolescence.   
The short-term successes which are critical to a successful sustained change 
effort, the new DOD policy formulation process might be applied to systems already in 
existence, such as FIST and Lighthouse.  Enabling these all-but-stalled systems to join 
the DOD IE following a rapid collaborative policy-making process would provide the 
DOD an asked-for capability in a timely manner, while still affording the COI the time to 
conduct extensive review on a real system, rather than one in development and testing.  
In witnessing the speedier yet judicious incorporation of novel technologies, stakeholders 
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in the DOD policy-making community might be better inclined to formally adopt an 
expedited policy formulation process for networks and software.   
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the results of the change effort were successful at the theoretical level, 
and significant time savings were achieved in conjunction with a 100% increase in 
throughput.  Moreover, despite the addition of personnel, the changes achieved cost 
savings due to a drastic reduction in wait time.  The true difficulty in effecting this 
change effort would be implementing it within the DOD, as an inherently hierarchical 
organization would have some difficulty embracing a less structured and more 
collaborative process for making policy.  It is with that hierarchical structure, history, and 
culture in mind that the full discussion of change management was included in Appendix 
E.  To that end, and as mentioned previously, this researcher recognized that the entire 
DOD structure would not be modified around the issuances process.  Therefore, the more 
formal reviews leading to the SecDef level approval were left untouched in an effort to 
appease some of the discontent which might stem from radical change and make 
acceptance of the change effort more likely, while the change effort would be directed at 
lower levels of the bureaucracy.  
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
This research began by introducing the risks involved in the incorporation of 
secure mobile technologies within tactical ground combat units, such as loss or theft of 
the device, risks in the supporting architecture, and risks in data transport.  Following 
discussion of both the new technological capabilities smartphones offer as well as 
vulnerabilities to the force which these capabilities bring with them, this research then 
broadly outlined uses of smartphone technology within tactical ground combat units in 
both humanitarian assistance and counterinsurgency scenarios.  Having taken the premise 
of incorporation of smartphones into tactical units as a given, this research discussed 
implementation methods available such as Lockheed Martin’s MONAX and Oceus 
Network’s Xiphos system.   
With the background case for smartphones, both good and bad, presented, this 
research turned to a discussion of existing policy.  Starting with top-level DOD 
documents, such as the Mobile Device Strategy from the DOD CIO, this research 
examined successively more detailed policy documents.  Taking into account guidance 
from senior leadership in the Marine Corps, and the priorities of the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, this research surveyed the current USMC Vision and Strategy, the 
MAGTF 2012 C2 Roadmap, and the USMC Commercial Mobility Strategy to assess how 
USMC leadership sees smartphones fitting into the Marine Corps Information Enterprise 
(IE). 
Digging a level deeper, this research conducted a review of existing DOD security 
policy, with the understanding that USMC security policy overwhelmingly falls within 
the scope of larger DOD directives.  A range of security policy directives and initiatives 
were examined, and the research covered broad topics such as cybersecurity to those with 
narrower scope, such as PKI and PK enabling.   
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Reflecting the improvement-oriented nature of this research, this research 
presented the case study of FIST and Lighthouse at the Naval Postgraduate School to 
demonstrate a real system which has been impacted by current policy, and whose 
adoption might be expedited through an improved policy process.  Through the lens of 
this case study, this research tackled the analysis aspect of smartphone security, and first 
sought to determine if the existing security policies, as written, contained shortfalls which 
created vulnerabilities.  
Following this discussion, the research proceeded to assess the current policy 
formulation process to again determine shortfalls in the process which might introduce 
risk.  The final portion of this research focused on providing recommendations to address 
the gaps and shortfalls identified in the analysis section as well as suggest a means by 
which a new policy formulation process might be introduced into the DOD.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the work mentioned above, this research offers several conclusions 
regarding the incorporation of secure mobile technologies within Marine Corps tactical 
ground combat units.  First, it is clear that the effort to incorporate such technologies is 
two-pronged, as both senior leadership and troops at the lowest levels are keen to take 
advantage of the benefits such technology affords.  Second, as with any rapidly 
advancing technology, the likelihood of introducing vulnerabilities is inherent in their 
very adoption.  With these two conclusions in mind, it becomes clear that the objective 
for the successful incorporation of needed smartphone capabilities down to the lowest 
tactical levels becomes risk mitigation and minimization.   
As they stand now, current security policies are sufficiently vague as to allow 
them to remain the guidelines and framework for security systems, but inadequately 
detailed for use as a blueprint when building a secure device.  In other words, while 
security policy requires developers to address the right topics, the policies do not, and this 
researcher argues cannot, list out the vulnerabilities to test or every software 
configuration to avoid.  The issue then becomes whether to demand more granularity be 
included in existing security policy, or require an entirely novel approach to the 
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acquisition development, testing, and evaluation process.  As previously discussed, it is 
well beyond the scope of this research to delve into reforming the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations, and hence this research turned to the lesser issue of designing a more rapid 
policy creation process.   
While amending the current research to reflect the vulnerabilities identified in the 
FIST case study would assist FIST developers and reduce the risks involved in 
incorporating FIST into a tactical unit, as the Process modeling for the As-Is scenario 
demonstrated, that would be akin to “fixing today’s problem’s tomorrow.”  The current 
policy creation process is sluggish, particularly when compared to the rapidity of 
innovation surrounding smartphone technologies.  This mismatch ensures that 
incremental corrections to existing policy will not solve the endemic lag between security 
policy and the edge of current technology.   
Taking principles of business process reengineering, design thinking, and change 
management into account, this research proposed a modification to the existing policy 
formulation process which is more collaborative and iterative and less hierarchical or 
scripted.  Bearing in mind the organizational and political considerations and implications 
of a less-controlled process, this research suggested a hybrid collaborative-hierarchical 
model for policy formulation based on information communications technologies which 
would both accelerate the process and afford sufficient top-level oversight.  The results of 
the process improvement were discussed in the previous chapter, and are also displayed 
in the appendices.  Suffice it to say, while the modeling in this research was entirely 
theoretical, the ameliorated results alone give adequate cause for excitement at the 
prospects of a revamped process.   
The true danger to any BPR initiative lies in the reluctance to accept the radical 
change.  For this reason, this research included quite a bit of literature concerning change 
management.  While seemingly superfluous, the discussion of change management is in 
fact the lynch pin of the entire effort, since without lasting reform, the underlying 
mismatch between policy and smartphone technologies will remain unresolved, and the 
risks will only increase.  It is precisely this potential for future harm which should spur 
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the “crisis” necessary to accept radical change.  It has been the objective of this research 
to highlight the crisis and suggest a possible remedy. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
During the course of this research, several opportunities for future research 
became readily apparent, which out of considerations for time and scope, were omitted 
and left for future inquirers.  These possibilities are outlined below.   
1. Acquisitions Process Research 
As mentioned previously, the mismatch between existing policy and smartphone 
technologies might be solved in two ways.  Given the scope of the effort in this paper, the 
research sought to illuminate ways in which the policy formulation process might be 
made more responsive and comprehensive.  The alternative involves a reform of the 
acquisition process.  
The current acquisition process is bureaucratic in the extreme, and once the 
process gets moving, the weight of its inertia has the potential to carry forward poor ideas 
and half developed concepts.  Taking the business process reengineering, design thinking, 
and change management principles discussed in this paper, a comprehensive assessment 
and modeling simulation for acquisition process reforms might also bear fruit. 
2. Creating Policy as a Design Thinking Exercise 
This research focused on the possibilities available for correcting the systemic 
mismatch between policy and rapidly evolving technologies using smartphones as a case 
study.  What this research did not do was to actually present a draft policy document 
developed using the proposed policy formulation process.  A motivated researcher, well 
connected to industry and DOD stakeholders as well as to experts in the fields of 
information technology, computer security, and a few other creative and fertile minds, 
could extend this research onto its next logical step and actually produce a draft 
smartphone security policy document for consideration using a rapidly iterative design 
thinking process.  
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3. Creating a Secure Smartphone Using Design Thinking 
Similar to the creation of a security policy using design thinking methodologies, 
and in keeping with  Hall’s (2012) research for improving the command and control 
systems and set up for the U.S. Navy Submarine Force, further research should consider 
building a secure smartphone using a design thinking process.  The development of a 
secure mobile system in a more open and collaborative style should allow the inclusion of 
all of the benefits of the novel technologies while also provided for an evolutionary 
advantage in assessing and designing for the trade-offs in security, utility, and 
functionality.   
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Process Time And Cost
Process Scenario Instances Total Cost Waiting Time (Time)
Total Time 
(Time)




Activity Performer Occurs Waiting Time (Time)




Distribute Office of the Secretary of Defense 36 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Posting Review Office of the Secretary of Defense 36 0:45:00 9:00:00 9:45:00
Signature Office of the Secretary of Defense 36 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Legal Objection Review Office of the General Council 36 25:30:00 72:00:00 97:30:00
Legal Sufficiency Review Office of the General Council 36 102:30:00 180:00:00 282:30:00
Post Issuance to Portal 3 Directives Division 36 216:30:00 18:00:00 234:30:00
Post Issuance to the Portal 2Directives Division 36 192:15:00 18:00:00 210:15:00
Post issuance to the Portal Directives Division 36 233:30:00 18:00:00 251:30:00
Precoordination Edit Directives Division 36 92:30:00 219:45:00 312:15:00
Presignature Review Directives Division 36 144:15:00 219:45:00 364:00:00
Provide Clearance Defense Office of Prepublication and Securi  36 2:00:00 72:00:00 74:00:00
Assign Number to Issuance Component 36 468:15:00 36:00:00 504:15:00
Comply with OGC recommen Component 25 323:30:00 50:00:00 373:30:00
Determine External Coordin Component 36 517:00:00 36:00:00 553:00:00
Incorporate Directives Edit Component 36 516:45:00 72:00:00 588:45:00
LSR Revisions Component 9 74:15:00 18:00:00 92:15:00
Obtain Signatures Component 36 482:45:00 18:00:00 500:45:00
Prepare Action Memo Component 36 395:15:00 36:00:00 431:15:00
Prepare Routing Form Component 36 538:30:00 36:00:00 574:30:00
Prepare the Final Package Component 36 275:45:00 72:00:00 347:45:00
Request DOPSR Clearance ReComponent 36 307:30:00 18:00:00 325:30:00
Request Formal Coordinatio Component 36 499:00:00 18:00:00 517:00:00
Request LOR Component 36 515:00:00 18:00:00 533:00:00
Request Legal Sufficiency ReComponent 36 398:30:00 18:00:00 416:30:00
Request Presignature ReviewComponent 36 444:30:00 18:00:00 462:30:00
Revise the Issuance Component 36 423:45:00 72:00:00 495:45:00
Write Issuance Component 36 464:30:00 108:00:00 572:30:00
OSD Inbox 1 Any member of Office of the Secretary of D  36 0:00:00 351:00:00 351:00:00
OGC Inbox 1 Any member of Office of the General Counc  36 0:00:00 288:00:00 288:00:00
OGC Inbox 2 Any member of Office of the General Counc  36 0:00:00 720:00:00 720:00:00
EA Inbox 1 Any member of External Agencies Inbox 36 0:00:00 648:00:00 648:00:00
Formal Coordination Any member of External Agencies 36 14:00:00 72:00:00 86:00:00
DOPSR Inbox 1 Any member of DOPSR Inbox 36 0:00:00 198:00:00 198:00:00
DD Inbox 1 Any member of Directives Division Inbox 36 0:00:00 432:00:00 432:00:00
DD Inbox 2 Any member of Directives Division Inbox 36 0:00:00 432:00:00 432:00:00
DD Inbox 3 Any member of Directives Division Inbox 36 0:00:00 342:00:00 342:00:00
DD Inbox 4 Any member of Directives Division Inbox 36 0:00:00 432:00:00 432:00:00
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Resource Unit Cost/Unit Threshold Usage Cost
Any member of External AgeHour 338.5 0 72 $24,372.00
Any member of DOPSR InboxHour 0 0 198 $0.00
Office of the Secretary of DeHour 520.61 0 81 $42,169.41
Any member of Office of the    Hour 0 0 351 $0.00
Office of the General Counci Hour 404.34 0 252 $101,893.68
Component Hour 338.5 0 644 $217,994.00
Any member of Directives D  Hour 0 0 1638 $0.00
Directives Division Hour 331.04 0 493 $163,202.72
Any member of Office of the   Hour 0 0 1008 $0.00
Defense Office of Prepublica    Hour 331.04 0 72 $23,834.88
Any member of External Age  Hour 0 0 648 $0.00
Performers Queue Length and Utilization
Name Average Min Max Utilized(%) Idle(%)
Any member of External Age 0.02 0 2 10.24 89.76
Any member of DOPSR Inbox 0 0 0 0.94 99.06
Office of the Secretary of De 0 0 1 11.52 88.48
Any member of Office of the    0 0 0 1.66 98.34
Office of the General Counci 0.18 0 4 35.83 64.17
Component 9.45 0 24 91.57 8.43
Any member of Directives D  0 0 0 7.76 92.24
Directives Division 1.25 0 10 70.17 29.83
Any member of Office of the   0 0 0 4.78 95.22
Value of 'Creator' 0 0 0 0 100
Generic 0 0 0 0 100
Defense Office of Prepublica    0 0 1 10.24 89.76
Any member of External Age  0 0 0 3.07 96.93
Bottlenecks
Process Activity Performer Avg Queue Length Min Queue Length
Max Queue 
Length
DODIssuances Assign Number to Issuance Component 0.67 0 3
DODIssuances Comply with OGC recommendations Component 0.46 0 2
DODIssuances Determine External Coordination Component 0.74 0 3
DODIssuances Formal Coordination Any member of Exte  0.02 0 2
DODIssuances Incorporate Directives Edit Component 0.73 0 4
DODIssuances LSR Revisions Component 0.11 0 1
DODIssuances Legal Objection Review Office of the Genera  0.04 0 2
DODIssuances Legal Sufficiency Review Office of the Genera  0.15 0 4
DODIssuances Obtain Signatures Component 0.69 0 3
DODIssuances Post Issuance to Portal 3 Directives Division 0.31 0 5
DODIssuances Post Issuance to the Portal 2 Directives Division 0.27 0 3
DODIssuances Post issuance to the Portal Directives Division 0.33 0 5
DODIssuances Posting Review Office of the Secreta   0 0 1
DODIssuances Precoordination Edit Directives Division 0.13 0 2
DODIssuances Prepare Action Memo Component 0.56 0 3
DODIssuances Prepare Routing Form Component 0.77 0 3
DODIssuances Prepare the Final Package Component 0.39 0 2
DODIssuances Presignature Review Directives Division 0.21 0 3
DODIssuances Provide Clearance Defense Office of Pre    0 0 1
DODIssuances Request DOPSR Clearance Review Component 0.44 0 3
DODIssuances Request Formal Coordination Component 0.71 0 3
DODIssuances Request LOR Component 0.73 0 4
DODIssuances Request Legal Sufficiency Review Component 0.57 0 3
DODIssuances Request Presignature Review Component 0.63 0 3
DODIssuances Revise the Issuance Component 0.6 0 3
DODIssuances Write Issuance Component 0.66 0 3
Note: Red-marked Waiting Time values indicates "Activity has waiting time"
Red-marked Usage values indicates "Usage crossed threshold"
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APPENDIX B. AS-IS KVA 
 
KVA - No REVENUE




36 Actions per year
.148 Actions per day
Revenue per action 10,000.00$    Reduction 10.00%
























 Cost per 




Days Days per day   Days   
Distribute 1 1 0.0511909 1 80 81 4.146463 1 5% 0.051191  $ 520.61  $          34.88  $          26.65 131% 13% 2% 1%
Posting Review 4 6 0.0511909 1 40 164 8.395308 0.27083 1% 0.013864  $ 520.61  $          70.62  $            7.22 978% 1% 5% 0%
Signature 1 1 0.0511909 1 20 21 1.075009 1 5% 0.051191  $ 520.61  $            9.04  $          26.65 34% 29% 1% 1%
Legal Objection Review 30 12 0.0511909 1 10 330 16.893 2.70833 14% 0.138642  $ 404.34  $        142.11  $          56.06 254% 4% 10% 1%
Legal Sufficiency Review 30 17 0.0511909 1 10 330 16.893 7.84722 40% 0.401706  $ 404.34  $        142.11  $        162.43 87% 11% 10% 4%
Post Issuance to Portal 3 1 1 0.0511909 1 80 81 4.146463 6.51389 33% 0.333452  $ 331.04  $          34.88  $        110.39 32% 32% 2% 2%
Post Issuance to the Portal 2 1 1 0.0511909 1 80 81 4.146463 5.84028 30% 0.298969  $ 331.04  $          34.88  $          98.97 35% 28% 2% 2%
Post issuance to the Portal 1 1 0.0511909 1 80 81 4.146463 6.98611 36% 0.357625  $ 331.04  $          34.88  $        118.39 29% 34% 2% 3%
Precoordination Edit 5 4 0.0511909 1 15 80 4.095272 8.67361 44% 0.44401  $ 331.04  $          34.45  $        146.99 23% 43% 2% 3%
Presignature Review 3 2 0.0511909 1 10 33 1.6893 10.1111 52% 0.517597  $ 331.04  $          14.21  $        171.35 8% 121% 1% 4%
DOPSR Provide Clearance 2 1 0.0511909 1 10 22 1.1262 2.05556 11% 0.105226  $ 331.00  $            9.47  $          34.83 27% 37% 1% 1%
Assign Number to Issuance 1 1 0.0511909 1 90 91 4.658372 14.0069 72% 0.717028  $ 338.50  $          39.19  $        242.71 16% 62% 3% 5%
Comply with OGC recommendations 4 6 0.0355492 1 10 44 1.564166 14.94 53% 0.531106  $ 338.50  $          13.16  $        179.78 7% 137% 1% 4%
Determine External Coordination 5 3 0.0511909 1 10 55 2.815499 15.3611 79% 0.786349  $ 338.50  $          23.68  $        266.18 9% 112% 2% 6%
Incorporate Directives Edit 4 3 0.0511909 1 20 84 4.300036 16.3542 84% 0.837185  $ 338.50  $          36.17  $        283.39 13% 78% 2% 6%
LSR Revisions 7 3 0.0127977 1 10 77 0.985425 10.25 13% 0.131177  $ 338.50  $            8.29  $          44.40 19% 54% 1% 1%
Obtain Signatures 3 2 0.0511909 1 50 153 7.832208 13.9097 71% 0.712051  $ 338.50  $          65.89  $        241.03 27% 37% 4% 5%
Prepare Action Memo 3 2 0.0511909 1 30 93 4.760754 11.9792 61% 0.613224  $ 338.50  $          40.05  $        207.58 19% 52% 3% 4%
Prepare Routing Form 2 1 0.0511909 1 30 62 3.173836 15.9583 82% 0.816921  $ 338.50  $          26.70  $        276.53 10% 104% 2% 6%
Prepare the Final Package 5 2 0.0511909 1 60 305 15.61322 9.65972 49% 0.49449  $ 338.50  $        131.34  $        167.38 78% 13% 9% 4%
Request DOPSR Clearance Review 2 1 0.0511909 1 70 142 7.269108 9.04167 46% 0.462851  $ 338.50  $          61.15  $        156.68 39% 26% 4% 3%
Request Formal Coordination 2 1 0.0511909 1 70 142 7.269108 14.3611 74% 0.735158  $ 338.50  $          61.15  $        248.85 25% 41% 4% 5%
Request LOR 3 5 0.0511909 1 70 213 10.90366 14.8056 76% 0.75791  $ 338.50  $          91.72  $        256.55 36% 28% 6% 6%
Request Legal Sufficiency Review 2 1 0.0511909 1 70 142 7.269108 11.5694 59% 0.59225  $ 338.50  $          61.15  $        200.48 31% 33% 4% 4%
Request Presignature Review 2 1 0.0511909 1 70 142 7.269108 12.8472 66% 0.657661  $ 338.50  $          61.15  $        222.62 27% 36% 4% 5%
Revise the Issuance 5 3 0.0511909 1 10 55 2.815499 13.7708 70% 0.704941  $ 338.50  $          23.68  $        238.62 10% 101% 2% 5%
Write Issuance 20 10 0.0511909 1 15 320 16.38109 15.9028 81% 0.814077  $ 338.50  $        137.80  $        275.57 50% 20% 9% 6%
Externals Formal Coordination 4 8 0.0511909 1 20 84 4.300036 9.75 50% 0.499111  $ 338.50  $          36.17  $        168.95 21% 47% 2% 4%
Sum 153 100 3508 176 13.6 1,480.00$       4,637.20$       32% 31%
Correlation 90%        
SO = Savvion Output












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 86 





Process Time And Cost
Process Scenario Instances Total Cost Waiting Time (Time)
Total Time 
(Time)




Activity Performer Occurs Waiting Time (Time)




Distribute Office of the Secretary  72 0:00:00 18:00:00 18:00:00
Posting Review Office of the Secretary  72 0:00:00 18:00:00 18:00:00
Signature Office of the Secretary  72 0:00:00 72:00:00 72:00:00
Directives Editing Directives Division 72 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Provide Clearance Defense Office of Prep    72 0:00:00 144:00:00 144:00:00
OSD Inbox 1 Any member of Office      72 0:00:00 360:00:00 360:00:00
Legal Inbox Any member of Office     72 0:00:00 144:00:00 144:00:00
Final Legal Review Any member of Office    72 0:00:00 72:00:00 72:00:00
Legal Editing Any member of Office    72 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Formal Coordination Editing Any member of Extern  72 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
DOPSR Inbox 1 Any member of DOPSR 72 0:00:00 144:00:00 144:00:00
Portal Inbox Any member of Directi   72 0:00:00 144:00:00 144:00:00
Assign Number to Issuance Any member of Compo 72 0:00:00 18:00:00 18:00:00
Coallate Edits Any member of Compo 72 0:00:00 144:00:00 144:00:00
Draft Issuance Any member of Compo 72 0:00:00 144:00:00 144:00:00
LSR Revisions Any member of Compo 18 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Obtain Signatures Any member of Compo 72 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Post issuance to the Portal Any member of Compo 72 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Prepare Action Memo Any member of Compo 72 0:00:00 72:00:00 72:00:00
Prepare the Final Package Any member of Compo 72 0:00:00 144:00:00 144:00:00
Request DOPSR Clearance ReAny member of Compo 72 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Request Legal Sufficiency ReAny member of Compo 72 0:00:00 36:00:00 36:00:00
Resource Unit Cost/Unit Threshold Usage Cost
Any member of DOPSR InboxHour 0 0 144 $0.00
Office of the Secretary of DeHour 520.61 0 108 $56,225.88
Any member of Office of the    Hour 0 0 360 $0.00
Any member of Office of the  Hour 404.34 0 108 $43,668.72
Any member of Component Hour 338.5 0 702 $237,627.00
Any member of Directives D  Hour 0 0 144 $0.00
Directives Division Hour 331.04 0 36 $11,917.44
Any member of Office of the   Hour 0 0 144 $0.00
Defense Office of Prepublica    Hour 331.04 0 144 $47,669.76
Any member of External AgeHour 338.5 0 36 $12,186.00
Performers Queue Length and Utilization
Name Average Min Max Utilized(%) Idle(%)
Any member of DOPSR Inbox 0 0 0 27.57 72.43
Value of 'Creator' 0 0 0 0 100
Generic 0 0 0 0 100
Office of the Secretary of De 0 0 0 20.68 79.32
Any member of Office of the    0 0 0 68.93 31.07
Any member of Office of the  0 0 0 6.89 93.11
Any member of Component 0 0 0 33.6 66.4
Any member of Directives D  0 0 0 27.57 72.43
Directives Division 0 0 0 6.89 93.11
Any member of Office of the   0 0 0 27.57 72.43
Defense Office of Prepublica    0 0 0 27.57 72.43
Any member of External Age  0 0 0 0 100
Any member of External Age 0 0 0 6.89 93.11
Bottlenecks
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KVA - No REVENUE




72 Actions per year
.148 Actions per day
Revenue per action 10,000.00$    Reduction 10.00%
























 Cost per 




Days per day   Days   
Distribute 1 3 0.137865 1 80 81 11.16707 0.25 3% 0.034466  $ 520.61  $          62.46  $          17.94 348% 35% 4% 2%
Posting Review 4 8 0.137865 1 40 164 22.60986 0.25 3% 0.034466  $ 520.61  $        126.47  $          17.94 705% 1% 9% 2%
Signature 1 3 0.137865 1 20 21 2.895165 1 14% 0.137865  $ 520.61  $          16.19  $          71.77 23% 44% 1% 6%
DD Directives Editing 3 4 0.137865 1 10 33 4.549545 0.5 7% 0.068933  $ 331.04  $          25.45  $          22.82 112% 9% 2% 2%
DOPSR Provide Clearance 2 4 0.137865 1 10 22 3.03303 2 28% 0.27573  $ 331.04  $          16.96  $          91.28 19% 54% 1% 8%
Final Legal Review 30 14 0.045955 3 10 330 45.49545 5 23% 0.689325  $ 404.34  $        254.47  $        278.72 91% 11% 17% 24%
Legal Editing 30 18 0.045955 3 10 330 45.49545 2 9% 0.27573  $ 404.34  $        254.47  $        111.49 228% 4% 17% 10%
Externals Formal Coordination Editing 1 3 0.137865 1 80 81 11.16707 1 14% 0.137865  $ 338.50  $          62.46  $          46.67 134% 7% 4% 4%
Assign Number to Issuance 1 7 0.0344663 4 90 91 12.54572 0.5 2% 0.068933  $ 338.50  $          70.17  $          23.33 301% 3% 5% 2%
Coallate Edits 3 4 0.0344663 4 20 63 8.685495 0.5 2% 0.068933  $ 338.50  $          48.58  $          23.33 208% 5% 3% 2%
Draft Issuance 2 4 0.0344663 4 10 22 3.03303 2 7% 0.27573  $ 338.50  $          16.96  $          93.33 18% 55% 1% 8%
LSR Revisions 1 4 0.0086166 4 20 21 0.723791 2 2% 0.068933  $ 338.50  $            4.05  $          23.33 17% 58% 0% 2%
Obtain Signatures 2 4 0.0344663 4 20 42 5.79033 0.25 1% 0.034466  $ 338.50  $          32.39  $          11.67 278% 4% 2% 1%
Post issuance to the Portal 1 3 0.0344663 4 90 91 12.54572 2 7% 0.27573  $ 338.50  $          70.17  $          93.33 75% 13% 5% 8%
Prepare Action Memo 4 4 0.0344663 4 20 84 11.58066 2 7% 0.27573  $ 338.50  $          64.78  $          93.33 69% 14% 4% 8%
Prepare the Final Package 3 5 0.0344663 4 70 213 29.36525 2 7% 0.27573  $ 338.50  $        164.25  $          93.33 176% 6% 11% 8%
Request DOPSR Clearance Review 3 4 0.0344663 4 50 153 21.09335 0.5 2% 0.068933  $ 338.50  $        117.98  $          23.33 506% 2% 8% 2%
Request Legal Sufficiency Review 3 4 0.0344663 4 30 93 12.82145 0.5 2% 0.068933  $ 338.50  $          71.72  $          23.33 307% 3% 5% 2%
Sum 95 100 1935 265 3.1 1,480.00$       1,160.31$       128% 8%
Correlation 94%        
SO = Savvion Output
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APPENDIX E.  FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY PROCESS CHANGE 
The following chapter provides the theoretical framework for the approach to 
analysis and change regarding policy and the policy formulation process through a 
discussion of the interrelated fields of Business Process Reengineering (BPR), 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA), Change Management, and Design Thinking. 
D. BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING 
1. Background of Process Improvement Techniques 
When Hammer and Campy (1993) popularized the term “business process 
reengineering,” they touted the end of the industrial age and heralded the rise of a new, 
postindustrial era.  Hammer and Campy (1993) contended that as a result of that shift, 
into what we might now call the age of design, a topic which will be covered later in this 
paper, many of the cornerstones industrial age practice have become irrelevant in today's 
business environment. Adam Smith (1956) classified the paradigm of the industrial age 
as the division of labor and economies of scale in his 1776 The Wealth of Nations, and it 
was on these assumptions that industrial era corporations were built and organized. 
Fundamentally, these corporations broke complex processes into numerous highly 
simplified and specialized tasks that even poorly educated workers could perform 
efficiently (Brewster, 1997). Smith showed how by dividing the process of making 
straight pins into 18 tasks, each of which was coordinated and integrated by layers of 
management, 10 employees could increase their productivity from less than 100 pins a 
day to 48,000.  The management echelons and functions in turn served as the foundation 
of the modern bureaucracy (Smith, 1956).  In keeping with the concept of division of 
labor and economies of scale, the separation of the production process encouraged similar 
division in management of organizations into simplified and separated manageable 
management tasks (Hammer & Champy, 1993).  
Despite the historical success of industrial age practices, Hammer and Champy 
(1993) concluded that that very same set of management principles in fact hinder modern 
organizations’ ability to compete in this, the post-industrial age, and viewed 
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reengineering as the method of change to realize new ways of doing business.  In 
response to the simple question, “If the industrial era paradigm worked for over 200 years 
why change now?”, Brewster (1997) posited that just as in the private sector, where 
global competition has placed increased demands on businesses for effectiveness and 
efficiency with which industrial age techniques cannot cope, so too in the public and 
government sectors the pressure of public and congressional scrutiny mandates a change 
in process. 
2. Process Improvement Strategies 
As there are many differing perspectives on how one might approach problem 
solving, so too are there multiple flavors of process improvement (Brewster, 1997). 
Harrington (1991) ascribed to the need to continuously improve current processes in 
order to enjoy gains in efficiency and effectiveness.  On the other end of the spectrum, 
Hammer and Champy (1993) proposed that radical changes which attained breakthrough 
order-of-magnitude improvements are necessary to sustain an organization over the long 
term. 
This research identified three conceptual strategies for process improvement 
whose differences lie primarily in their theoretical approach and the prescribed rate of 
change. These three strategies for process improvement are: continuous process 
improvement (CPI), business process redesign, and business process reengineering 
(BPR). 
a. Continuous Process Improvement 
Continuous process improvement (CPI), which stems from the overarching 
concept of total quality management (TQM), aims to discover and correct problems 
occurring in the current process. Employees and Self-managed teams are encouraged and 
empowered to make task-level improvements in quality, cycle-time, and cost at the 
lowest level (Brewster, 1997). While CPI is typically performed within a particular 
business function, it may also involve cross-functional teams to a limited extent. The goal 
of implementing CPI is to have it become a philosophy and way of life within the 
organization.  Thus, in its ideal CPI is continuous, and employees are constantly finding 
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problems, identifying the causes, and incrementally modifying the process to fix those 
problems (Brewster, 1997).  
In the CPI strategy, performance gains are modest, and incremental (usually 
between 5-10 percent improvements in cost, time, or customer satisfaction).  CPI also 
carries with it comforting advantages in terms of costs and risk.  CPI incurs low costs as 
the level of organizational change and level of effort required to detect, correct, and adapt 
to the changes is low. CPI also mitigates risks as the investment cost for the change effort 
and the total scope of the change is again modest and incremental. (Davis 1994, Caudle 
1995).  Regarding information technology tools to assist with CPI, there are a number of 
well-defined tools available for use that require a only a moderate degree of training and 
learning time (e.g., control charts, Pareto diagrams, flow charts, cause and effect 
diagrams, histograms) (Brewster, 1997).  
b. Business Process Redesign 
As Brewster (1997) described, Business Process Redesign entails streamlining 
processes by eliminating activities which do not add positive value as well as efforts to 
integrate tasks in a process. Furthermore, in in process redesign strategy, direction setting 
and strategic planning from the corporate level focus cross-functional teams on specific 
improvement objectives (rather than simply letting the groups find their own issues). The 
overall feel and flow of the existing processes generally remains intact, and accompanies 
moderate increases in performance, and little to moderate changes in organizational 
structures (Davis 1994, Caudle 1995, Brewster, 1997). Finally, risk to process 
improvement success is increased as compared to CPI due to the increased levels of 
organizational change required (e.g., culture, tasks, structure, and roles) (Brewster, 1997).  
c. Business Process Reengineering 
What separates BPR from the previous two strategies is that the philosophical 
approach to BPR hinges on the radical redesign of a process to dramatically increase 
performance.  To that end, BPR focuses on delving to the root of things, and beyond 
merely fixing what is already in place, BPR seeks to discern fundamentally novel means 
of performing work (Hammer & Champy, 1993). The philosophy of BPR rejects the 
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notion that significant performance and efficiency gains may be achieved through 
incremental improvements alone (Brewster, 1997).  Hammer and Champy (1993) define 
BPR as  
The fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to 
achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance, such as cost, quality, service and speed. (Hammer and 
Champy, 1993, p .32) 
Put simply, BPR entails starting fresh and rebuilding a process from the ground 
up (Davis 1994, Hammer 1993).  In BPR cross-functional teams, which may also include 
non-organizational members such as customers, consultants, and facilitators, tear apart 
and then completely redesign a process end-to-end. As the scope of this change is the 
entire process, implementing BPR successfully almost always requires a high degree of 
organizational change both in an entity’s technical infrastructure and potentially even 
culture (Brewster, 1997). To achieve such results in the face of organizational resistance, 
BPR efforts are top-down projects which leverage leadership and strategic planning. 
Another key aspect of BPR is that, as opposed to CPI, BPR employs information 
technology to reengineer new processes rather than reinforcing existing processes 
(Brewster, 1997).  
Figure 17 compares and contrasts critical features of each of the aforementioned 
process improvement strategies: 
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Figure 17.  Process Improvement Approaches (from Caudle, 1995) 
Thorough examination of Figure 17 leads one to conclude that while all are 
oriented on a process customer focus. At the macro level the distinctions between the 
improvement strategies lie primarily as matters of scope and levels of organizational 
change required for successful implementation (Brewster, 1997). In this regard, it is also 
possible to view the process improvement strategies on a continuum from the minimally 
invasive CPI at one end, to the massively destructive and radical BPR on the opposite end 
as shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.  The Process Improvement Continuum (from Brewster, 1997) 
Integrating BPR into an organization which practices Lean and Six Sigma is best 
done from a strategic vision/top level leadership standpoint.  BPR is considered top-down 
and revolutionary in that it should produce radical results that dramatically alter an 
organization, particularly in an effort to avoid or mitigate significant pain.  Lean and Six 
Sigma on the other hand are more focused on eliminating waste and reducing variation, 
respectively, and are the more contemporary terms used to describe the CPI strategy 
mentioned above.  As such, Lean and Six Sigma advocate continuous incremental 
improvement of processes from the bottom up.  Therefore, while a company which does 
Lean/Six Sigma is likely to have a good understanding of its processes, BPR and 
Lean/Six Sigma are in a sense at odds with each other in that the latter seek to improve 
upon the status quo whereas the former seeks to destroy and rebuild it.  As O’Neill and 
Sohal (1999) asserted. however, the combination of the two conceptual business process 
improvement frameworks provides for a total improvement package as incremental 
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improvements from Lean/Six Sigma are good in the short term, and BPR is good over the 
long term.  Thus, major BPR efforts (which cannot be sustained indefinitely) should still 
be followed by TQM/CPI/Lean/Six Sigma efforts to produce maximum process 
improvements as shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.  Combination of BPR and CPI (from Brewster, 1997) 
3. Business Process Reengineering for the DOD 
While there is no simple formula for reengineering any organization, certain 
constraints for the DOD make the process increasingly complex.  Reengineering within 
the DOD occurs in a political milieu, where a starting from scratch methodology is 
typically impractical (Brewster, 1995). More specifically, the number and outlook of the 
various stakeholders for any DOD process are myriad.  Bryson (1995) defined 
stakeholders as “any person, group, or organization that can place a claim on an 
organization's attention, resources, or output or is affected by that output.” For the DOD, 
such stakeholders could include legislative and executive authorities and interests, the 
taxpayers, the media, special interest groups, unions, and a host of internal and external 
agencies that provide resources for, or receive services from, the DOD, not to mentioned 
 97 
international partners and allies.  The true complexity of BPR within the DOD becomes 
evident when one considers that these stakeholders influence political support, are party 
to or drivers of policy determinations, and exercise near total authority over funding 
(Caudle, 1995).  Caudle further defined the notion of reengineering in government: 
Government business process reengineering is a radical improvement 
approach that critically examines, rethinks, and redesigns mission-delivery 
processes and sub processes. In a political environment, it achieves 
dramatic mission performance gain from multiple customer and 
stakeholder perspectives. It is a key part of a process management 
approach that continually evaluates, adjusts, or removes processes or sub 
process for optimal performance. (Caudle, 1995, pp. 10) 
Thus, BPR within government, while it may follow the same theoretical 
methodology as BPR in any other context, that is, radical redesign and revolutionary 
change, the ability to achieve success requires additional consideration of the increased 
number of stakeholders and their degrees of control.   
4. Conclusion 
From the discussion of BPR and TQM above, and in light of the fundamental 
mismatch between the user requirements to rapidly evolving technology and the policy 
process which governs accessibility, a radical redesign of the policy formulation process 
is in order.  Naturally, it follows that incremental, that is CPI, strategies might ease the 
pain, but not sufficiently to correct the underlying issue.  In this sense, editing the current 
policy to encompass and address the latest developments can be viewed as a short-term, 
continuous improvement.  The objective of this research is to discuss how a redesign 
might happen, and what it might look like.  While BPR provides a conceptual framework 
for the type of change needed, an examination of three subsequent fields of study is 
required to complete the foundation.  Those fields are Knowledge Value Added, Change 
Management, and Design. 
E. KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED 
In very general terms, the Industrial Age sought to turn people, via an assembly 
line process, into automatons specially trained for a specific task and organized optimally 
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(hierarchically) to perform it ceaselessly.  In the modern Information Age, computers 
have allowed us to automate machines, and in effect reverse the shackling of human 
beings to the mundane repetitive tasks required under the old paradigm.  To that end, the 
real value of human beings is in their execution of knowledge in performing a task.  
Thus, as Stewart (1997) postulated,  
Knowledge has become the preeminent economic resource—more 
important than raw material; more important, often, than money. 
Considered as an economic output, information and knowledge are more 
important than automobiles, oil, steel, or any of the products of the 
Industrial Age. 
Knowledge value added (KVA) theory, then, is squarely rooted in the Information Age, 
and analyzes the performance of knowledge within an organization’s core processes in 
terms of the returns that knowledge generates (Housel & Bell, 2001, p. 93).  While KVA 
is derived from a sophisticated breakdown of thermodynamics, it is in fact 
straightforward to apply, and can be applied to nearly any level of any organization 
(Housel & Bell, 2001, pp. 91–93).  The fundamental assumptions of KVA are outlined in 
Figure 20.   
 
Figure 20.  Fundamental Assumptions of KVA (from Housel &Bell, 2001, p. 94) 
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1. Knowledge 
By extrapolation, several other axioms of KVA become apparent as well.  Indeed, 
as Housel and Bell (2001, p. 94) asserted, these assumptions are valid whether the 
knowledge executed is in people’s heads, or in an IT system, which also implies that the 
knowledge can be explicit, or tacit.  KVA derives common units of knowledge as 
observed in the execution of core processes and relates them to terms of price and cost.  
Thus the end result of a KVA analysis is a set of ratios which compare the price and cost 
of the knowledge units (Housel & Bell, 2001, p. 94).  To adequately capture the 
knowledge in a process, the KVA methodology turns to measuring the learning time 
incurred to gain proficient use of the knowledge. 
2. Learning Time 
As the measurable component of knowledge, the learning time is represented as 
the process (read time) to gain use of knowledge (Housel & Bell, 2001).  For example, if 
I can be shown how to write a cursive letter in one minute, but it takes me three hours of 
continuous practice to be able to master writing one on my own, then my learning time 
for that activity is three hours.  While the example is quotidian in that we would not add 
the time it took a person to master writing every letter into the learning time required to 
write a collegiate-level essay, it serves to illustrate the point that tasks require time to 
master; time which is separate from the time it takes to instruct someone in the 
performance of the task.  It is the time required to master use that KVA seeks to capture. 
As with knowledge, use of the learning time construct carries with it similar 
axioms.  Namely, learning can also be explicit or tacit, and learning time is related to a 
specific activity.  In this sense, logically, learning time is related directly to the 
complexity of the task (Housel & Bell, 2001).  It is also key to note that learning time as 
a measure in KVA analysis is concerned with the learning time in use, not the learning 
time residing in ‘inventory.’  In other words, a person might have a tremendous amount 
of skills in a variety of fields, but for KVA the only learning measured is the learning 
time required for the particular task involved in the core process being evaluated.  Put 
more simply, while the learning time to become a neurosurgeon is no doubt extreme, the 
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totality of that learning time (which would certainly be many years) cannot be used as a 
measure of the only task the surgeon performs in a process is to verify a prescription was 
written accurately (which might only in truth have taken a learning time of hours to 
days).  Thus, as alluded to in the previous discussion of knowledge as an economic 
resource, knowledge, and by extension learning time, are the ‘machines’ that drive output 
and revenue (Housel & Bell, 2001).   
As mentioned before, the knowledge, and hence the learning time, could reside 
within a person, or within information technology (IT).  As such, the learning time in a 
process represents the summation of the human and IT learning times (Housel & Bell, 
2001, p. 98).  Moreover, learning time can be measured ordinally, nominally, or in terms 
of actual learning time, and generally two different sets of subject matter experts will 
each come up with the learning time in a process or sub-process using a different method 
such that the two can be compared to provide transparency and accuracy.   
3. KVA Methodology 
Conducting a KVA analysis begins, as with any other corporate change or 
analysis technique, with identifying the core areas or processes to evaluate.  The 
evaluators would then gather data on the amount of knowledge in each sub-process by 
using the learning time approach.  Then, a sufficient sampling time would be measured to 
capture a representative sample of the processes final output.  In order to view the amount 
of knowledge executed in the process, the total learning time would then be multiplied by 
the number of times the process was executed in the sample period.  With the total 
amount of knowledge executed in hand, revenue and costs may be allocated to each 
component of the sub-process.  It is the addition of revenue (often based on market 
comparables) with costs that provides the ratios necessary to obtain return on knowledge 
(ROK) results for interpretation (Housel & Bell, 2001, p. 98).  Figure 21 illustrates the 
KVA methodology in terms of measuring learning time, process description, and a binary 
query method.    
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Figure 21.  Three Approaches to KVA (from Housel and Bell, 2001, p. 95) 
4. Implications of KVA 
Of the many implications the use of KVA analysis portends for organizations is 
the argument for moving knowledge which resides inside human employees into IT.  As 
Housel and Bell (2001) attested, organizations should move knowledge into IT systems 
when that knowledge is simple, procedural knowledge that fires frequently, or when the 
knowledge is volatile knowledge that might be lost when employees leave the 
organization.   
Take the first argument.  Is it necessary for people to become specially trained to 
format documents, or prepare routing forms?  Rather, can this knowledge be transferred 
into an IT system which automatically performs the task?  In this case, submitting a 
report involves both human and IT components, since the human still had to master the 
type of skill necessary to generate the report’s contents, and the IT system performed the 
formatting and routing.  This arrangement capitalizes on the creative potential of the 
human mind without shackling it to mundane, repetitive processes which a machine can 
accomplish ceaselessly and flawlessly. 
 102 
As for the second argument, retraining personnel is costly and time consuming.  
Worse, if only one person knows how to execute a process since that is the only position 
devoted to it, and that person is likely to leave or move on frequently, it makes sense to 
capture the knowledge in an IT system rather than risk losing it every time there is 
personnel turnover.  While many organizations have attempted to capture such 
knowledge using binders full of standard operating procedures, desktop procedures, and 
turnover materials, at the fundamental level the new employee must still learn the 
procedure nonetheless (recall the discussion of the difference between learning time and 
instruction time).  Hence, if possible, it makes more sense to transfer the knowledge to an 
IT system and not risk its loss. 
While KVA provides an organization with insight into how it makes use of its 
intellectual capital, as well as areas to target for improvement, KVA methodology does 
not discuss how to go about making these changes.  To tackle that aspect, the discussion 
turns now to the fields of Change Management and Design. 
F. CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN THINKING 
1. Change Management 
Put succinctly, change management is a field of study aimed at improving the rate 
of successful implementation of changes within an organization. The change 
management field is vast, includes many notable works, and provides numerous 
frameworks for thinking about and planning organizational change (Hall, 2012).  Given 
the more restricted scope of this research, this section will provide only a broad outline of 
change management theory with the goal of elucidating how difficult even a small 
modification can be in a hierarchical process within a large organization such as the 
DOD.  This research drew heavily on Hall’s (2012) discussion of change management in 
his thesis regarding the Tactical Advancements for the Next Generation (TANG) Forum, 
as well as referenced John P. Kotter’s works: 1996’s Leading Change and 2002’s The 
Heart of Change, David Gleicher’s change formula as modified by Dannemiller and 
Jacobs in their 1992 article, Changing the Way Organizations Change, and Professor 
Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline. 
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a. Creating Change 
The revised change formula Dannemiller and Jacobs (1992) advanced is  
D x V x F > R 
In this formula D represents dissatisfaction with the status quo, V represents the 
proposed and idealized vision of the future, F represents the first steps taken toward the 
vision, and R is the amount of resistance to be overcome.  These values are all relative, 
and not absolute, and objective measurement for each is possible.  Even a cursory 
mathematical examination of this formula implies that if a change effort is to succeed, the 
product of the dissatisfaction, the vision and the first steps toward the vision must be 
greater than the total amount of resistance applied against the change (Hall, 2012). It is 
also readily apparent that if any of the three factors working to create the change 
(dissatisfaction, vision, and first steps) is absent, then that side of the equation is reduced 
to zero, and the resistance is insurmountably greater (Dannemiller & Jacobs, 1992). More 
importantly, as Hall (2012) attested, while this formula does not guarantee the change 
effort will be successful, a firm grasp of the basic underlying concepts and theory is a 
prerequisite for fruitful discussion and problem framing for introducing and sustaining 
organizational change. 
While Kotter (2002, Kindle, location 87)) rightly posited that change management 
is a discussion or analysis of people’s behavior, Hall (2012) asserted that  
The dissatisfaction and the vision are things provided by management or 
leadership to the members of the organization. The first steps are a plan 
drawn up by management for the organization’s members to follow, and 
personnel, likely at all levels of the organization, generate the resistance. 
(p. 12).  
This researcher agrees with Kotter’s assertion, yet believes Hall’s is overly 
simplistic, and representative of an idealized hierarchical model wherein leadership is 
well-attuned to organizational problems and brilliant in seeing the future.  It is certainly 
valid to think leadership might be dissatisfied, as well as that leadership must be involved 
in any vision for the future.  However, this discussion ignores the very real possibility 
that the people at the very lowest levels of the organization are dissatisfied with some 
aspect of the organization, have their own vision of how things should be, and indeed, 
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take some steps toward  realizing that vision.  In that scenario, it may well be the 
leadership which provides the resistance to change.   
In his Heart of Change, Kotter (2002) further refines his statement that change 
hinges on people’s behavior by noting that the action which induces true change is 
“speaking to people’s feelings.” Kotter (2002, Kindle location 112, 125) proffered the 
opinion that a reasoned analysis aimed at impacting people’s thoughts is significantly less 
likely to alter their behavior than if they are “shown a truth that influences their feelings.” 
This is an important point and bears additional explanation.  It becomes apparent that 
while it may be possible to convince someone with facts that some form of change is in 
his or her best interests, that realization alone is unlikely to create the behavioral change 
required to achieve the vision. The type of enduring and meaningful change necessary 
necessitates an emotional connection to the change and reasons behind it (Hall, 2012). In 
concluding that line of thought, Kotter (2002, Kindle location 129) stated definitively, 
“The flow of see-feel-change is more powerful than that of analysis-think-change.” 
Jonathan Haidt (2012, Kindle page 47) rephrased the same notion in his work, The 
Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, when he 
attested “You can’t make a dog happy by forcibly wagging its tail. And you can’t change 
people’s minds by utterly refuting their arguments.” This discussion is in the context of 
this research as it underscores the simple yet critical point that pure factual argument 
alone (and to an extent a drawn out research paper) is unlikely to succeed in getting 
people to adopt new modes of behavior even when they cognitively understand why they 
should.   
Kotter (2002, Kindle location 403) expands upon the discussion of change 
management in providing organizational leadership with an “eight-stage change process.”  
Through the course of detailed discussions with corporate leadership, he discovered that 
while the stages may overlap, is it important they be kept in sequence in order for the 
cumulative effect of building upon one another toward realizing the change to occur 
(Hall, 2012).  The first four stages revolve around preparing the organization to reorient 
itself. The next three stages entail the introduction of the new direction, and the final 
stage is where the newly implemented change is made and integrated into the culture and 
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practice of the organization so that the change might be an enduring one (Kotter, 2002, 
Kindle location 376).   
The eight stages of Kotter’s (2002, Kindle location 375) change process are: 
• Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
• Creating the Guiding Coalition 
• Developing a Vision and Strategy 
• Communicating the Change Vision 
• Empowering Broad-Based Action 
• Generating Short-Term Wins 
• Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change 
• Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture 
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, the eight stages can be mapped fairly 
readily to Gleicher’s change formula. Stage one corresponds to the dissatisfaction with 
the status quo; stages two through four correspond with the proposed future vision of the 
organization; and stages five, six and seven represent the first steps toward achieving the 
change (Hall, 2012). 
(1) Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
The reason establishing a sense of urgency is so critical is that if the individuals 
within the organization feel that everything is going just fine, they will never embrace a 
change.  Thus the sense of urgency serves to loosen the grip of complacency upon the 
organization (Hall, 2012).  As the change formula suggests, it is the sense of 
dissatisfaction with the status quo that creates the willingness to be open to a new vision 
(Hall, 2012).  
(2) Creating the Guiding Coalition 
Good leaders in the both the civilian sector and within the military must develop a 
central core group of supporters for their change efforts (Hall, 2012).  A change vision 
may not yet exist, but this core group should be comprised of adventurous “early 
adopters” that are motivated to improve the organization and dedicated to spreading the 
new vision (Moore, 1991, Kindle Location 297). 
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(3) Developing a Vision and Strategy 
It is incumbent on the leader, in partnership with the guiding coalition to create 
and present a clear and simple vision statement which paints the picture of the future of 
the organization (Hall, 2012).  As Kotter (1995, Kindle Location 183) attested, the 
purpose of the vision is to “direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of large numbers 
of people.”  The simplicity and clarity of the vision cannot be overstated.  Kotter’s (1995, 
Kindle Location 202) rule for corporate visions was, “whenever you cannot describe the 
vision driving a change initiative in five minutes or less and get a reaction that signifies 
both understanding and interest, you are in for trouble.” 
(4) Communicating the Change Vision 
As noted previously, one of the reasons for creating a guiding coalition is that 
communicating the vision is of the utmost importance.  As Hall (2012) stated, “the vision 
creates its maximum effect when all members of the organization have a common 
knowledge and understanding of it and embrace it.” Unfortunately, it is fairly common 
that organizational leadership fails to communicate the vision they have created for the 
company effectively (Kotter, 1995, Kindle Location 1400).  It is insufficient to present 
the vision once or twice, and then assume that the entire population of the organization 
understands, and more importantly, embraces, the new direction. This is particularly 
salient given the fact that the average employee is bombarded with many other competing 
inputs and requirements (Hall, 2012).  Kotter (1995, Kindle Location 1442) also 
highlighted a second and equally critical component of communicating the vision is 
“leadership by example.” Indeed, the surest method for undermining the vision is for 
leadership (the very people who espouse the new direction), to behave in a manner 
inconsistent with the message being communicated (Hall, 2012). 
(5) Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action 
Kotter (1995, Kindle Location 1548) defined this stage as the removal of four 
types of “barriers to empowerment” for an organization’s employees. The first barriers 
are structural, and entail determining if the structure of the organization prevents 
effective employee actions as they work to embrace the change.  The second set of 
barriers focus on employee skills, and revolve around whether or not employees have 
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been provided the appropriate skill sets and training required to make the change (Kotter, 
1995, Kindle Location 1610). The third set of barriers are those of the underlying 
organizational system.  These barriers hinge on whether or not legacy organizational 
processes have been amended to reflect the new direction (Hall, 2012).  The final barrier 
is almost counterintuitive as it stems from whether the supervisors themselves are a 
barrier to the adoption of the change.  Indeed, while top-level leadership may well be on 
board, subordinate leaders might still act counter to the new vision, thereby ruining the 
impression of the entire leadership structure’s support (Hall, 2012).   
(6) Generating Short-Term Wins 
Though the long term prize should be kept visible, the members of the 
organization need to experience small victories which convince them that the ultimate 
change effort will be successful. Kotter (1995, Kindle Location 1772) referred to the need 
for short-term wins as “managing the current reality.”  As Kotter (1995, Kindle Location 
1817) outlined, a worthwhile short-term win is visible, unambiguous, and related to the 
change effort underway.  Short-term wins maintain the change’s momentum, and build 
credibility for the vision in the eyes of those who remain uncommitted or even resistant 
(Hall, 2012).   
(7) Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change 
Ensuring the change effort progresses until the final desired end-state is attained 
requires constant pressure since resistance to the change effort never dissipates 
completely (Hall, 2012).  While counterintuitive, celebrating a short-term win can send 
the message that no further effort is required, and induce a regression toward legacy 
processes and beliefs (Kotter, 1995, Kindle Location 1983).  It is key to note that the 
pain, or perceived upcoming future pain, which the sense of urgency created is 
uncomfortable, and hence the organization changes as a result of this discomfort.  Thus 
victories, no matter how small, give the impression that the pain should let up.  After all, 
isn’t that the cause for the celebration?    It becomes readily apparent that despite the 
short-term win, constant pressure will be required to maintain the sense of urgency in 
spite of the achievements along the way. 
(8) Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture 
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This final stage is in essence a continuation of the aforementioned stage, but goes 
beyond mere achievement of the desired result. This stage is focused on cementing the 
change into the organization’s culture such that the results become self-sustaining 
(Kotter, 1995, Kindle Location 2197).  In other words, if this stage is accomplished 
successfully, and the state change has been internalized, the departure of one individual, 
even if it is the visionary leader himself, should not derail the change. 
b. Resistance to Change 
As Hall (2012) posited, and as indicated by the change formula, a constant 
pressure toward maintaining the status quo works against the effort placed into the 
changing.  For the change effort to succeed, this resistance must be overcome. Kotter 
(1995, Kindle Location 1996) stated that while there are naturally some forces which 
resist the initial change implementation effort, there are other, separate forces which seek 
to subvert the effort throughout its life cycle.  In Heart of Change, Kotter described four 
types of behavior that tend to derail the initial change effort: 
the first is complacency, driven by false pride or arrogance. A second is 
immobilization, self-protection, a sort of hiding in the closet, driven by 
fear or panic. Another is you-can’t-make-me-move deviance, driven by 
anger. The last is a very pessimistic attitude that leads to constant 
hesitation. (Kotter, 2002, Kindle Location 338) 
Moving to the second set of resistance factors, Kotter then provided eight reasons 
for resistance to change throughout a change effort’s life cycle.  These factors, which can 
be found in Leading Change (Kotter, 1995, Kindle Location 362), are: 
• Inwardly Focused Cultures 
• Paralyzing Bureaucracy 
• Parochial Politics 
• Low Levels of Trust 
• Lack of Teamwork 
• Arrogant Attitudes 
• Lack of Leadership in Middle Management 
• The General Human Fear of the Unknown  
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The final aspect of an organization’s resistance to change is that of system 
dynamics. While the struggle between the innovators and early adopters against the 
laggards may be divisive and protracted, neither side is to blame for this contentiousness: 
he entire organization works as a system. As Senge (1990, p. 67) pointed out, there is no 
“separate other;” all of the protagonists and antagonists are part of a single system. The 
cure, therefore, lies in one’s relationship with the “enemy.”   
c. Conclusion 
Change management, while an invaluable resource to leverage when 
implementing organizational change, does not in and of itself guarantee success. Change 
management only improves the odds of a successful effort (Hall, 2012). The change 
management field also fails to outline how to create a vision, and does not identify the 
steps necessary to implement that vision in a practical sense. In order to delve into 
practical concerns regarding how one might adapt a highly bureaucratic process such as 
DOD policy-making, a journey into a separate but related field is required to strip away 
the final level of abstraction from the heretofore esoteric and academic discussion.  That 
field is design.   
2. Design Thinking 
Since there are a multitude of conceptions and misconceptions surrounding design 
and design thinking, this paper will refer to the idea of “design thinking” by making use 
of Brown’s (2009) original description from Change by Design: “Design thinking relies 
on our ability to be intuitive, to recognize patterns, to construct ideas that have emotional 
meaning as well as functionality, to express ourselves in media other than words or 
symbols.” The mention of emotional meaning in addition to functional meaning is 
perhaps the critical aspect of design thinking.  This theme will resurface later on in the 
discussion of applying design thinking to problem solving.  Another interesting aspect of 
design thinking is that in incorporating the emotional component of problem solving, 
good design solutions not only solve the problems for which they were developed, but 
also others which were not anticipated (Boland & Collopy, 2004, Kindle Location 264).   
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The rapidly iterative process of design thinking sets it apart from standard “linear 
problem-solving (Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2011, Kindle Location 230).” Liedtka and Ogilvie 
(2011, Kindle Location 230) portray the linear problem-solving processes as problem 
definition, solution identification and analysis, followed by the selection of the “correct” 
choice.  On the other hand, design solutions are based primarily upon empathy and 
experimentation (Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2011, Kindle Page 230).  The stark contrast between 
the two methodologies is clear, and one may surmise that adherence to one over the other 
might reflect not only a penchant for a particular process, but even a separate world view.  
Senge (1990, Kindle Page 321) underlined the importance of design thinking to 
an organization in his view that organizational leaders neglect the role of a “leader as 
designer” in terms of how view themselves.  In this context, Senge’s argument for the 
role of the leader as designer suggests that the leader should focus on constructing the 
organization to maximize interaction between the organization’s members rather than be 
the primary driver of new ideas (Hall, 2012).  Therefore, the leader is concerned with how 
his organization thinks, not what it thinks.  Design thinking, therefore, is a conceptual 
problem solving framework for tackling any problem, internal or external, an 
organization may face (Hall, 2012).  As Senge (1990, Kindle Location 207) attested,  
It’s just not possible any longer to figure it out from the top, and have 
everyone else following the orders of the “grand strategist.” The 
organizations that will truly excel in the future will be the organizations 
that discover how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all 
levels in an organization. 
To help guide the leader, Liedtka and Ogilvie (2011, Kindle Location 377-399) 
presented three basic growth lessons derived from observation of those who implemented 
design thinking into their organizations successfully.  These growth lessons are: 
• You don’t have to search far and wide to find opportunities. There are 
opportunities to improve through design in everything we do and what we 
surround ourselves with. 
• You don’t have to bet big in order to be successful. In fact, big bets often 
cause failure. Place small bets fast, and learn, learn, learn. 
• Speed thrills. Developing a corporate climate that thinks, moves and 
innovates fast can become addictive and lead to continuous improvements 
and learning. 
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Liedtka and Ogilvie (2011, Kindle Location 4414-438) also provided several 
maxims for growth.  Hall (2012) explained that several of these maxims hold high 
relevance for the DOD.  As such, the relevant growth maxims for the DOD are “Focus on 
meeting genuine needs” and “Explore multiple options.” The first maxim stresses the 
need for empathy concerning the customer for which the product, process or organization 
is being designed (Hall, 2012). The second maxim touches back on the idea of placing 
small bets quickly in order to learn from experience.  In other words, this highlights the 
idea of rapid and simultaneous prototyping of several options at once. Of particular note, 
this method is not equivalent to the prototyping the DOD performs through its 
acquisitions process for major systems. Rather, the design thinking version of prototyping 
emphasizes the use of “inexpensive materials to examine the problem as opposed to 
building a couple of multi-million dollar weapon systems to compete against one another 
and be analyzed for failure modes” (Hall, 2012). 
a. Innovation 
Senge (1990, Kindle Page 5) describes an innovation in simple terms as an 
invention that can be dependably reproduced at a practical cost.  From this definition, one 
can extrapolate that while design thinking will therefore probably generate innovation, an 
innovation or innovative process may or may not incorporate elements of design 
thinking.  
From the literature on innovation, design, and design thinking, it is commonly 
accepted that most mature and established organizations optimize and specialize 
themselves over time for the efficient performance of routine activities (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010, Kindle Location 347, 356).  This organizational occurrence does not 
indicate fault in the company, but rather stems from the natural tendency to maximize the 
cost to benefit ratio, particularly as it applies to processes which are predictable and 
routine.  However, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010, Kindle Location 358) also 
contended that such specialization bring two distinct aspects of the organization into 
conflict; namely what they referred to as the “performance engine” and the innovators. 
These two forces represent what James March (1991) termed the “exploitation” and 
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“exploration,” elements of an organization, respectively.  Described concisely, the 
performance engine, or exploitation, portion of the organization is focused on ensuring 
daily operations remain efficient and profitable, while the innovators, or exploration, 
portion seeks to find new products or processes.  
As resources within any organization are always somewhat scarce, both 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010) and March (1991) portrayed the two segments as in 
conflict and competition. The typical business is generally not well organized or disposed 
to balance the two, and as such, maintaining a healthy equilibrium and relationship 
between them must to some degree fall to leadership and management (Hall, 2012).   
b. Empathy 
As noted previously, empathy is at the heart of design thinking. Liedtka and 
Ogilvie (2011, Kindle Location 194) argued that, “Design starts with empathy, 
establishing a deep understanding of those we are designing for.”  Tim Brown (2009), 
CEO and President of IDEO, described the presence of empathy as the distinguishing 
characteristic between design thinking and purely academic exercises. In his words,  
We are not trying to generate new knowledge, test a theory, or validate a 
scientific hypothesis—that’s the work of our university colleagues and an 
indispensable part of our shared intellectual landscape. The mission of 
design thinking is to translate observations into insights and insights into 
products and services that will improve lives. (Brown, 2009, Kindle 
Location 627)  
In Wired to Care, Patnaik and Mortensen (2009), described empathy as “seeing 
the world as it really is.”  This definition seems somewhat rosy, so perhaps trying to see 
reality from someone else’s frame of reference and trying to understand how they 
experience their reality is a better means of describing empathy (Hall, 2012).  Regardless, 
seeing reality through the eyes of the customer for whom the output of the design process 
is intended is nevertheless a relevant and critical goal. 
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c. The Design Process 
As there are many different versions and examples of design processes, this paper 
will rely primarily on that outlines in the Bootcamp Bootleg from Stanford University’s 
Hasso Platford Institute of Design, also known as the d. school.   
The Bootcamp Bootleg lists five phases of their design process. They start with 
“empathize,” and move through “define,” “ideate,” and “prototype” to conclude with 
testing. Works on Design by Brown (2009) and Cross (2011) also allude to the existence 
of a precursory design phase: The Brief. 
The Brief. Before the designers can launch into an empathic investigation of the 
problem space, Hall (2012) explained that the designers typically receive a brief 
consisting of the goals and constraints for the project. While the goals often seem 
straightforward, they frequently require further examination, and may change over time.  
This evolution stems from the fact that while customers bring set design goals to the 
effort initially, these goals must generally be adapted to a higher level of abstraction in 
order to apply the design process (Hall, 2012). As an example, the customer might open 
the design effort with the goal to “improve aluminum can recycling on Wednesdays.”  
Elevating this goal to make it more applicable to a design process, the goal might become 
might become, “How do we increase awareness of recycling opportunities? (Hall, 2012)” 
Stanford’s d.school and Tim Brown (2009, Kindle Page 194) described such questions as 
“How might we” questions or “HMWs.”  
From the simple discussion above, it becomes relatively clear that the brief is 
necessary to orient the designers to the problem space, but that it is hardly set and in 
stone and will tend to evolve as the designers further define the problem.  The brief 
should bound the problem space and provide direction to the designers, but should not be 
overly restrictive such as to eliminate the type of creative problem solving inherent in the 
design process.  Indeed, Cross (2011, Kindle Location 256) presented his thoughts on 
what the brief should be by highlighting that the reason for a degree of flexibility in the 
brief is to allow the designers to define and refine the problem as they attempt to solve it.  
Furthermore, and of significance, Cross did not hold the brief to represent a concrete set 
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of requirements or specifications for the final product. To reinforce the point, Cross 
highlighted a statement from his interview with architect Richard MacCormac about 
design wherein MacCormac asserted that “often in competitions the winning scheme is 
the one that tells the client something that they never knew before … something that is 
terribly important to them and was not in the brief  (Cross, 2009, Kindle Location 256).” 
Empathize. The empathize phase, also known as the observation phase, revolves 
around focusing the designer’s empathy toward the actual user for the product or process 
(Kelley, 2001, Kindle Page 25).  Empathizing with the end user can be difficult, 
particularly as the customer, i.e. the one paying for the design effort, is typically not the 
actual consumer of the product or process (Hall, 2012).   
Senge (1990, Kindle page 63) offered a pithy description of the criticality of the 
“empathize” phase, and noted the high likelihood that best insight garnered from the 
research will be something small, and something heretofore unnoticeable.  As he 
proffered, “Small changes can produce big results –but the areas of highest leverage are 
often the least obvious (Senge, 1990, Kindle page 63).”  Senge (1990, Kindle page 63) 
furthered his analysis by orienting the empathy phase into a systems thinking approach, 
and attested that the most obvious methods for creating the desired impact are perhaps the 
least likely to create the desired effect, while “small, well-focused actions can sometimes 
produce significant, enduring improvements, if they’re in the right place.”  Therefore, the 
underlying goal of the empathize phase is to find leverage points, or in other words, “to 
find the points at which maximum effort may be applied optimally to produce the greatest 
effect for the customer’s user experience” (Hall, 2012). 
Define. IDEO referred to the define stage as “generating insights” (Hall, 2012).  
Once the information, feelings and emotions are gathered, the define phase begins.  As 
Hall (2012) suggested, “Seldom can the user describe what is missing or required to 
perform their job in the form of a complete solution. It is typically necessary to 
synthesize the inputs of the users into a couple of insights.”  It is these insights which are 
then used to guide the “point of view” perspective of the design sessions, focus the design 
effort on the needs of the user, as well as be the source of the “How might we” questions 
used in the brainstorming portion of the next phase (Hasso Plattner). 
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Ideate. This phase has been alternatively referred to as brainstorming as the goal 
is to create a substantive pool of ideas from which to later choose (Brown, 2009, Kindle 
location 852).  As two-time Nobel Prize winning chemist Linus Pauling posited, “To 
have a good idea, you must first have lots of ideas (Brown, 2009, Kindle location 855).”  
Kelley (2001, Kindle location 738) outlined that brainstorming is the “the idea engine of 
IDEO’s culture,” and the aforementioned HMWs focus brainstorming sessions around 
the problem space and the end user. To stimulate people’s creative potential, and to fully 
embrace Pauling’s theme, IDEO follows seven self-explanatory rules in its “ideating” 
sessions: 
• Defer Judgment 
• Encourage Wild Ideas 
• Build on the Ideas of Others 
• Stay Focused on Topic 
• One Conversation at a Time 
• Be Visual 
• Go for Quantity (Hasso Plattner) 
In addition to the rules for ideation listed above, Brown (2009, p. 81) and Cross 
(2011, Kindle location 216) also suggest sketching as an invaluable practice to reinforce 
and elucidate ideas during brainstorming.  Cross (2011, Kindle location 216) noted 
brainstorming sketches served as a “temporary, external store for tentative ideas” to assist 
the designer in presenting his idea where words alone might be insufficient.  Kelley 
(2001, Kindle location 734) also recommended that brainstorming sessions be limited to 
sixty minutes in duration, due to the substantial levels of mental exertion entailed. 
From the rules and suggestions above, it becomes obvious that brainstorming is 
guided yet unscripted process.  This is not to say that “anything goes.”  On the contrary, 
brainstorming is a focused and taxing process oriented on the rapid generation of ideas 
from which to choose, and more importantly, the interchange between different people 
and their ideas.  Kelley (2001, Kindle location 848-868) listed a set of procedures which 
are sure to stifle and stymie any true brainstorming session.  
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His list of “Six Ways to Kill a Brainstormer” are: 
• The Boss Gets To Speak First 
• Everybody Gets A Turn 
• Experts Only Please 
• Do It Off-Site 
• No Silly Stuff 
• Write Down Everything 
The initial objective of the brainstorming session, as mentioned, is the generation 
of a large pool of ideas from which to choose.  Once this large pool exists, and better yet, 
if the ideas are all sketched out in some visual form, the ideas are grouped, or further 
divided into sub-groups depending on the number, by function or other criteria (Hasso, 
Plattner).  Once grouped, the design team selects the most popular ideas through voting 
or other means of consensus (Hasso Plattner). 
Prototyping. As the Bootcamp Bootleg described, the objective in the 
prototyping phase is to translate the most popular ideas selected from the ideation phase 
down from the conceptual level of abstraction and into a physical setting.  Kelley (2001, 
Kindle location 1456) outlined that prototyping is not only more engaging than mere 
sketches, but also creates an environment conducive to envisioning the potential solution 
and how that solution might be adapted to better meet the needs of the brief. 
While prototyping is a well understood means for reducing risk prior to going into 
full production, which consequently is why the DOD also requires prototypes as part of 
its project management process, the prototyping described in this design process differs 
markedly (Bolland & Collopy, 2004, Kindle location 3541-3542).  As Hall (2012) 
commented, the principle difference between the two is that the prototyping phase of the 
design process is done early on the development cycle, and is also “done in order to 
engage the imagination through tactile interaction with a very low cost, low risk form of 
possible solutions.”  At a relatively low cost, the project is thereby defined through 
experimentation early on in the process. As Boehm and Basili’s (2001) research showed, 
significant investment in the requirements analysis and design phases of software 
development portends the possibility to reduce the cost of subsequent error correction by 
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a factor of 100.  Boland and Collopy (2004, Kindle location 3541-3542) highlighted that 
the physical manifestation and manipulation of ideas allows the designers to provide 
feedback on potential solutions from an experiential rather than conceptual basis. 
As intimated above, “these early prototypes are intended to be created and 
evaluated quickly and cheaply” in order to gain the insights from physical interaction 
without creating an emotional “overinvestment” between the designer and the prototype 
(Hall, 2012).  Brown (2009, Kindle location 1148) noted that a rapid build and discard or 
move forward methodology through the use of low-cost materials early in the 
development process minimizes the risks associated with proceeding upon a poor idea, 
and increases the chances of discovering new opportunities.  Moreover, such rapid and 
inexpensive prototyping is not limited to design of a physical object, and is equally 
applicable to software.  For instance, one could easily prototype and demonstrate 
software interfaces using Post-it notes instead of having to write multiple iterations of 
code (Brown, 2009, Kindle location 1173).   
Testing. Testing provides the design team with the opportunity to observe the end 
user interacting with the prototype and receive feedback (Hasso Plattner).  Naturally, the 
phases of the design thinking process are continuous throughout, and as such there exists 
the “opportunity to brainstorm about how to conduct the test itself, and then prototype the 
test if desired” (Hall, 2012).  Since most of the excitement in design thinking revolves 
around the brainstorming and prototyping phases, the testing phase is also less 
substantively detailed in the literature (Hall, 2012).  
d. Failure 
As Hall (2012) explained, one of the aspects which sets design thinking apart is 
its tolerance for, and even encouragement of, failure.  Indeed, this notion is borne out in 
one of IDEO’s core philosophies: “fail early to succeed sooner (Brown, 2009, Kindle 
location 228).”  Other literature also stresses the iterative growth which accompanies 
failure.  In Yes to the Mess, Professor Barrett (2012, Kindle location 887) remarked that 
accepting failure can often lead one along “the pathway to discovery, especially in highly 
experimental and innovative cultures.”  It is important to note that in this context failure 
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is not catastrophic cancellation of a major DOD acquisitions system, but rather the rapid 
generation and reformulation of the problem space and potential solutions.  Thus these 
early failures are those of requirements analysis and solution design which serve as a cost 
effective and swift means of experimentation (Hall, 2012).  From this discussion, it 
becomes plain to see that such “failures” should be encouraged and allowed to happen as 
early into the process as possible in order to avoid costly rework later on in the process. 
e. Morale 
Two other significant aspects of design thinking and the design thinking process 
become evident in any reading of the subject area, and relate to the morale of designers 
and participants (Hall, 2012).  First, the literature suggests that the very process of 
empathy-building engenders a degree of fun and enjoyment in the workplace (Patnaik & 
Mortensen, 2009, Kindle location 2790).  Second, and in similar fashion, Kelley (2001, 
Kindle location 1214) proffered a subtle but seemingly obvious idea that “When people 
feel special, they’ll perform beyond your wildest dreams.”  These two concepts are not 
merely part of a “feel-good” speech during a relaxing yoga session.  In design thinking 
they go to the very heart of the process; people matter.  Surely the end-user is important, 
but so too are the designers themselves as the very productivity on which the project’s 
success hinges is inextricably linked to the designers who go through the process. 
f. Conclusion 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the heart of design thinking is people.  
The notions of creating empathy to better understand the end-user, ideation, acceptance 
of failure, and morale all revolve around the human being’s centrality to the process.  In 
the view of this researcher, there is potential to leverage design thinking in the DOD 
policy formulation process, particularly as it applies to areas of rapid technological 
advancement, such as smartphones, since the ideation and iterative process may well 
afford a more rapid means of stimulating development while at the same time allowing 
for comprehensive security safeguards. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
To summarize the major components of the literature review in the context of this 
research, the preceding chapter discussed technological capabilities of smartphones, the 
higher headquarters policies which encourage the use of smartphones, and a conceptual 
discussion of business process reengineering, change management, and design thinking.  
The following chapters will provide particulars about the FIST system, specifically issues 
which have arisen in its implementation and use, and examine the extent of the mismatch 
between current policies and the policy creation process and existing technologies. 
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APPENDIX F.  SAVVION PROCESS MODELER 
A complete description of how to use Savvion’s process modeler can be found in 
Gear up! Savvion Process Modeler…in 20 Minutes or Less, Savvion’s program tutorial 
(Savvion, 2006).  For the sake of brevity, the basics of how Savvion takes inputs and 
translates them into outputs will be discussed here. 
The process modeler allows even non-technical stakeholders to intuitively and 
graphically depict and analyze a business process.  This is done primarily through three 
components: performers, swim lanes, and activities.  A performer is an actor or entity 
(such as a group of actors) which executes a function inside the business process.  The 
first thing one does in creating a Savvion model is to create performers, as shown in 
Figure 22, who take the actions therein: 
 
Figure 22.  Dialogue Box for creating a Performer (from Savvion, 2006, p. 9) 
Additional aspects of a performer are the type of performer (single actors or a 
group), as well as the group size, group rate, and whether all members of the group must 
perform an action, or if any single member may perform it (in this sense consider that any 
mechanic of the many in an auto body shop can perform work on a car, but all members 
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of a jury must be present during a hear or when reaching a verdict).  It is in these boxes 
that the pay rates presented in chapter 4 were entered.  Figure 23 displays how to enter 
settings for a performer’s attributes. 
 
Figure 23.  Performer Attributes (from, Savvion, 2006, p. 10) 
Once the performers are set up, the process modeler prompts a user to create 
swim lanes.  Per the tutorial,  
Used in workflow diagrams to organize processes across functional 
boundaries, Swim Lanes are horizontal sections that delineate which 
performer is responsible for a group of task steps. A benefit of Swim 
Lanes is that when an Activity task step is dragged to a Swim Lane (or 
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moved from one Swim Lane to another), the task automatically inherits 
the Performer assigned to the Swim Lane. (Savvion, 2006, p. 11) 
Finally, the modeler prompts the user to add activities and then links, which 
connect activities together within and between swim lanes.  Activities are assigned to one 
or multiple performers and are assigned work times.  As depicted in Figure 24 illustrates, 
links can be modified to allow for decision points, probabilities (such as the likelihood 
that something will have to be resubmitted, etc.). 
Figure 24.  Link Properties (from Savvion, 2006, p. 19) 
Once the performers, swim lanes, activities, and links are created, the model is 
now ready to be run in a simulation.  As an example, a complete Savvion process model 
might appear as in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.  Complete Savvion process model (from Savvion, 2006, p. 32) 
To model the process, the key elements to set are the number of instances and the 
interval with which they appear (in other words, how frequently the system must deal 
with a new instance).  As discussed in chapter four, this research used one year’s worth of 
instances in the As-Is model, and two years’ worth (set to occur within a one year time 




Figure 26.  Savvion simulation set up (from Savvion, 2006, p. 28) 
Savvion then runs the simulation, substituting a few seconds of time for each 
“hour” simulated (it was for this reason that this research converted work days to work 
hours, as mentioned in chapter four).  The results come out of the model as viewed in 
Appendices A and C.  These results break out time to complete each activity in a given 
swim lane, adds up the total work time required for each performer to accomplish all 
assigned activities, as well as depicts the time spent idle for each activity and in total.  
Idleness is generally a function of a bottle neck in that if a faster moving performer 
precedes a slower one in the process, which is in turn preceded by a regular or fast 
moving performer, the two more rapid performers sit around waiting for work while the 
slower one has a large pile sitting in its queue.  Using the factors of total work time and 
idleness, Savvion then provides utilization percentages, essentially a measure of work 
efficiency, for each performer.  Since hourly rates were input for each performer, this 
output also allows for a visualization of cost per action and total cost for the number of 
instances sent through the system.   
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